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Abstract
The information revolution is the single most important change in society since the
printing press. At no other time has our society benefited from nearly limitless access
to information and communication, and the changes brought on by this access have
changed, and are changing, society in fundamental ways. Our homes, our workplaces,
and our democracy have all been transformed by information and communication
technologies.
However, our ethics have not kept pace with our technological progress, and the
immense changes brought by this this revolution have posed some equally immense
moral questions. Indeed, there has been an almost total lack of religious discourse
regarding the problems which have arisen out of the information revolution. This
thesis is an attempt to change that.
The thesis itself is structured as a series of essays on four key problems:
1. Intellectual Property, as it relates to Scripture
2. Information Ethics, the novel moral theory arising from Computer Ethics
3. Robotic Ethics, especially the ethics of robotic warfare
4. Hacker Culture, and its implicit spirituality
Each of these essays attempts to tackle one of these key problems, and demonstrate
how a religious perspective illuminates some aspect of it. As befits a thesis from a
Jesuit, Catholic university, most of the essays are drawn from a Catholic, Christian
perspective.
Acknowledgements
This thesis could not have been written without the support and steadfast encour-
agement of a number of wondrous people. First of all, I am deeply grateful to my
advisor, Dr. Richard Spinello, for his grace, kindness, and patience. He has always
been a source of wisdom and support, and has been generous with both his time and
his network. I cannot express how grateful I am.
I am also deeply indebted to my perpetually-overworked reader, Dr. Stephen Pope,
for his grace in taking me on as yet another project in his queue. Despite always
juggling several projects, Dr. Pope never failed to make time for me when I asked for
it, and has been a source of wisdom and guidance.
James Keenan, SJ, has always been a mentor and advisor, and has now assumed
the mantle of director of the Presidential Scholars Program. I am grateful the program
will be in such capable hands. I am also grateful to the astonishing Ms. Jennie Thomas,
who has never failed to be the picture of kindness and resourcefulness, and whose help
in securing institutional resources was key to the success of this project.
The first chapter in particular is indebted to the comments and feedback from
Edward Vacek, SJ, who has been a mentor and a source of wisdom for my final two
years at Boston College. Father Vacek never ceases to astonish me with his wisdom
and kindness, and I value greatly my journeys to the School of Theology and Ministry.
The second chapter is likewise indebted to the feedback from Dr. Luciano Floridi
who, despite his considerable standing within the scholarly community, was willing to
spend a great deal of time with an insignificant undergraduate, and even sponsor me
for a summer in Oxford. His brilliance is matched only by his kindness.
The third chapter owes a great deal to the kind attention of Andrea Vicini,
SJ, another Italian of ferocious, yet kind, intellect. His comments, feedback, and
encouragement helped me write a very strong chapter, and I am deeply grateful.
The final chapter is indebted to Dr. Roberto Goizueta, who not only invested his
time and talents, but was patient enough to listen to a young man babble on about
technology and take the time to understand it.
Dr. Boyd Taylor Coolman, and his estimable wife Dr. Holly Taylor Coolman have
been extraordinary mentors during my time at Boston College. I have never ceased
to marvel at their kindness, wisdom, and equipoise, not to mention their gracious
hospitality. Boston College has made a very wise decision in granting Dr. Coolman
tenure; I can only hope that many generations of young theologians can benefit from
his kind mentorship.
Arthur Madigan, SJ is, in addition to being extraordinarily learned, is quite
possibly the kindest and humblest man I know. I have benefitted immensely from
studying under his tutelage, and have grown not only as an ethician and a scholar, but
as a person. Should I be so blessed, I hope to become like Arthur Madigan someday.
Dr. Rob Gross and his wonderful wife Edie Rosenberg have been mentors since
my days as a green freshman, and I regard them with the respect I do my parents. I
thank them for their patience and good humor, and look forward to many more trips
across Boston to sample new cuisine.
Dr. Michael Martin has been a mentor and friend since my sophomore year at
Boston College. He has been patient even with such a frustratingly linear thinker like
myself. I am deeply grateful that the College of Arts and Sciences had the foresight to
choose such a remarkable man for interim dean of the Junior class. I can only hope he
continues to be such a wonderful pillar of the Boston College Community, and deeply
apologize for making him resort to his first-year logic textbook to read my papers.
Ms. Kyoko Wada, and the entire tea circle of wada shachu have been a source of
wisdom, strength and growth for me at Boston College. They have taught me the
virtues of hospitality, and how to fall in love with anyone I meet. I am forever changed
for the better for my interaction with them, and I commend any who seek the way of
tea to their tutelage.
I am deeply grateful to Ms. Courtney McKee, for always being a pillar of strength
and sanity despite tempestuous times. She will make a wonderful physician, and the
world is better for her in it.
I am also grateful to Ms. Betsy Hilliard, who was perpetually frank, yet kind. My
oldest friend, and soon to be a professor in her own right. I am grateful for her love.
Mr. Yuping Toh taught me how to love in a way I had never known before, and
I will be forever grateful. He is a kind, wonderful, decent man; and I hope he finds
happiness. He also introduced me to a wondrous group of people — Mr. David Cheung,
Mr. Joseph Davies-Gavin, Mr. Edward Howland, and the entire crew of the Boston
Gay Men’s Chorus. My hat is off to such a fine group of gentlemen.
Mr. John Falcone, Mr. Matias Wibowo, Mr. Bert Ouellette, Mr. Joel Nebres,
Mr. Rocco Pigneri, Mr. Gilbert Macabuag, Mr. Steven Young, Mr. Alan Yee and
everyone at Dignity/Boston have given me a spiritual home in Boston.
Dr. Patrick Cheng has been a source of kindness and wisdom in Boston, as well. I
hope he settles into the city, and that many more learn from his wise teachings.
Mr. Leslie Tay has been a kind and generous tutor in many arts, not the least of
which is music. I hope the future treats him well, that he finds his place in the Opera
world, and that he is shown even a fraction of the love he has shown me.
Mr. Celso Javier Perez taught me how to be a polite activist, and, for both the
lessons on etiquette and activism, I am grateful. He will doubtless change the world.
I am grateful also to Mr. Robert Kubala, Mr. Brian Varian, and Mr. Steven Liu,
who have taught me the value of forgiveness.
Most importantly, I am grateful to my parents, Bill and Doni Molony. They have
given me everything, and I can only hope that I can repay their boundless love and
sacrifice with love of my own.





1.1 Copylight of the World: Intellectual Property & the New American Bible 3
1.2 Cosmopoesis: A Theological Interpretation of Information Ethics . . 5
1.3 Mercy and Justice in Robot Ethics: A Christian Approach . . . . . . 7
1.4 God in All Code: The Ignatian Spirituality of Hacker Culture . . . . 8
2 Copylight of the World: Intellectual Property and the New Ameri-
can Bible 10
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Case Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Background: Justification for Intellectual Property . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3.1 Locke: Labor-Desert Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3.2 Hegel: Personality Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3.3 Mill/Bentham: Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4 Ownership of Scripture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.5 Scripture and IP Rights Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.5.1 Scripture and the Lockean Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.5.2 Scripture and the Hegelian Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.5.3 Scripture and the Utilitarian Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.5.4 Scripture is its own Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.6 Comparison: ICEL vs. USCCB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.6.1 ICEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.6.2 USCCB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.6.3 Reconciliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3 Cosmopoesis: A Theological Interpretation of Information Ethics 33
3.1 The Ontology of Goodness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.1.1 God the Sustainer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.1.2 Meonic Evil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2 Homo Poieticus: Christianizing Floridi’s Philosophical Anthropology . 37
3.2.1 Floridian Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2.2 Christian Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2.3 Reconciling the Floridian and Biblical accounts . . . . . . . . 41
3.3 Cosmopoiesis: The Information Ethics Teleology and Eschatology . . 45
3.3.1 Information Ethics Eschatology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3.2 Christian Eschatology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3.3 Harmonizing Information Ethics and Christian Eschatology . . 49
4 Mercy and Justice in Robot Ethics: A Christian Approach 52
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.2 Christian Foundations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.2.1 Holy War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.2.2 Christian Pacifism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.2.3 Just, or Limited War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.3 The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.4 Autonomous vs. Semi-Autonomous Robots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.5 Ethical Issues in Semi-Autonomous Robots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.6 Ethical Issues in Autonomous Robots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.6.1 Embedded Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.6.2 Indirect Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.6.3 Direct Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.7 Critique of Machine-Learning in Autonomous Robots . . . . . . . . . 72
4.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5 God in All Code: The Ignatian Spirituality of Hacker Culture 77
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.2 Joy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.2.1 Art, Science, and Play: Hacker’s Joy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.2.2 Moments of Consolation: Ignatian Joy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.3 Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.3.1 The Contagious, Wondrous Joy of Programming: Hackers’ Mission 84
5.3.2 Ignatian Indifference: Poverty, and the Mission . . . . . . . . 86
5.4 Magis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.4.1 Raymond’s Ethic of Constant Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.4.2 Ignatian Ethic of Striving for Perfection . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.5 Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.5.1 Men and women for others: Jesuit faith that does justice . . . 92
5.5.2 Shared labor: Hacker cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.6 Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.6.1 Jesuit Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.6.2 Hacker Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96






The information revolution is the single most important change in society since the
printing press. At no other time has our society benefited from nearly limitless access
to information and communication, and the changes brought on by this access have
changed, and are changing, society in fundamental ways. Our homes, our workplaces,
and our democracy have all been transformed by information and communication
technologies.
However, our ethics have not kept pace with our technological progress, and the
immense changes brought by this this revolution have posed some equally immense
moral questions. Issues like privacy, strong security, and intellectual property will have
deep and far-reaching consequences for us now, and will only increase as computers
grow more prevalent. Indeed, one group of voices which have been conspicuously absent
from the current discussion are religious voices. Religious communities have been
deeply formative of our collective conscience; thinkers like St. Augustine, St. Thomas
Aquinas, Mahatma Gandhi, Archbishop Romero and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. have
left deep marks on even secular thinkers.
However, there has been an almost total lack of religious discourse regarding the
problems which have arisen out of the information revolution. While the Holy See,
to its credit, produced two very general statements1 on the subject, with a short
follow-up statement on social media2, there has been almost no concentrated effort on
the part of religious thinkers to address issues arising from the Information Revolution.
This thesis is an attempt to change that.
I do not pretend that this thesis lays out a complete or definitive religious answer to
questions raised in computer ethics. Partly, this is because the issues are both thorny
and manifold; partly this is due to the rapidly-changing nature of computer ethics,




and partly due to a great respect for wiser thinkers who could contribute much to the
topic. However, what I do intend for this thesis is the beginning of a conversation. By
laying out detailed, religious responses to computer ethics problems, I hope to impress
upon my fellow theologians that these issues are worthy of attention, and to impress
upon the community of philosophers that so far have taken these problems on that
religious thinkers can have dynamic contributions to the field.
The thesis itself is structured as a series of essays on four key problems:
1. Intellectual property, as it relates to Scripture
2. Information ethics, the novel moral theory arising from computer ethics
3. Robotic ethics, especially the ethics of robotic warfare
4. Hacker culture, and its implicit spirituality
Each of these essays attempts to tackle one of these key problems, and demonstrate
how a religious perspective illuminates some aspect of it. As befits a thesis from a
jesuit, catholic university, most of the essays are drawn from a Catholic, christian
perspective.
1.1 Copylight of the World: Intellectual Property
& the New American Bible
The first chapter deals with the copyright policies surrounding the New American
Bible (NAB), the authorized translation of the Bible put forward by the Magisterium
as the official translation of the Bible used in the worship and liturgy of the Roman
Catholic Church in the English language. While the translation is not highly used in
the scholarly world, it is regarded as a solid, if somewhat conservative, bible used for
3
Chapter 1: Introduction
devotional use. The first part of the chapter introduces the NAB, and establishes its
importance.
Attempts to bring the NAB into the 21st Century, however, have been met with
mixed success. Indeed, the current copyright policies regarding electronic distribution
of the NAB are nothing short of incoherent. While some of the sloppiness of the current
policy of the bishops’ conference may be attributed towards a changing understanding
of how people use computers, especially given the rise of mobile computing, the
current policy is very difficult to parse. The second section of the essay delves into
how incoherent this policy really is, and makes the case that it is a problem needing a
solution.
In order to have a solution to the problem, however, one needs a solid foundation.
The third section of the essay delves into the theoretical foundations of intellectual
property regimes, including three major forbears:
1. Locke’s Labor-Desert Theory
2. Hegel’s Personality Theory
3. John Stewart Mill and Jeremy Bentham’s Utilitarian Theory.
Scripture, however, is a very complicated work. The fourth section of the essay
attempts to lay out precisely who has claim to the Bible. The problem is difficult,
however, since in the multi-millennial history of the text, untold numbers of people
have labored to produce what we have today. Indeed, I attempt to lay out a theological
argument regarding the Bible as properly belonging to all people, given the great
commission, but held in stewardship by the institutional church.
This problem is laid bare in the fifth section of the chapter, where the status of
Scripture established in the previous section is shown to be incompatible with each of
the IP frameworks established earlier. Indeed, Scripture appears to be so radically
4
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different from the models of intellectual property thus established that I argue it
appears to be in a category of its own.
Finally, having shown that Scripture does not fit easily into established frameworks.
I then examine how Scripture is handled by two separate arms of the institutional
church: the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), and the Interna-
tional Commission for English in the Liturgy (ICEL). The USCCB and the ICEL have
radically different frameworks, which befits their separate functions — the USCCB,
being a teaching arm, attempts to centralize control, while the ICEL, fundamentally
a cooperative body, attempts to standardize texts as widely as possible, and therefore
promotes comparatively liberal sharing. In trying to harmonize the two, I argue for
adopting ICEL’s model more widely, essentially prioritizing access to scripture while
accommodating efforts to preserve its integrity.
1.2 Cosmopoesis: A Theological Interpretation of
Information Ethics
The single biggest development to arise from the computer ethics field has been the
development of a new moral system by Dr. Luciano Floridi, currently of the University
of Oxford. In his new system3, Dr. Floridi argues for the concept of information to
take a sort of priority in moral philosophy that concepts like being have held before.
While the system is not without controversy, it represents a real innovation not only
for computer ethics, but for the wider discipline.
The second chapter is an attempt to get the christian tradition and Dr. Floridi’s
traditions to intersect. Floridi is, essentially, a platonist, and so I alternate Augustine
3Luciano Floridi; Jeroen van den Hoven and John Weckert, editors, Chap. 3 In ‘Information
Ethics: Its Nature and Scope’, (Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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and Eastern Orthodox neo-platonist sources as a place for intersection.
The first section of the chapter describes Floridi’s fundamental value judgement,
which references inforgs — a sort of ontologically minimalist notion which encompasses
any structured object at a given level of abstraction:
1. Inforgs exist
2. Ceteris Paribus, this existence is a good thing
3. Therefore, existing inforgs have “a Spinozian right to persist in its own status,
and a Constructionist right to flourish, i.e. to improve and enrich its existence
and essence.4”
Using the notion of God as sustainer, I transform Floridi’s base value judgement
into a notion that God’s presence in sustaining beings can form the basis of an ethical
system.
In the second section of the chapter, I attempt to christianize Floridi’s anthropology.





I tie these notions to the Holy Trinity, and show how each of these ontic powers
can be seen as deriving from the human’s partial participation in the divine life of
each of the persons of the Trinity.
In the final section of the chapter, I explore floridian and christian eschatology,
and speculate on how they need not be contradictory. I also propose a name for the
rather awkward information ethics project with the name Cosmopoeisis.
4Floridi, ‘Information Ethics: Its Nature and Scope’ (as in n. 3), p. 48.
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1.3 Mercy and Justice in Robot Ethics: A Chris-
tian Approach
Computers are also changing the way in which we conduct war. While much has been
made of the threat of cyberwar, computers are now entering the battlefield in the
person of robots. As mechanization appears inevitable, the christian community will
be called to assess this new weapon of war. The first section of chapter 4 attempts to
do just that — layout how the face of war will be changing.
The second section attempts to lay out the foundations for a christian approach to




While dismissing the first almost outright, the chapter examines whether the kind
of pacifism shown by the US bishops in the face of nuclear weapons5 is warranted.
Ultimately, the section decides that robots do not pose the same sort of indiscriminate
threat, and decides on a just war stance for pragmatic, pastoral reasons.
The chapter then examines some rather terrifying statistics from Iraq and Afghanistan
which are used by the proponents of robotic warfare to justify some of their claims.
This helps to situate the moral situation in its appropriate gravity.
In the next section, the chapter makes a distinction between autonomous and
semi-autonomous robots. These machines are not autonomous in the sense of being
moral agents, but are autonomous in the sense of being able to function apart from
humans for a time — anywhere from a few minutes to hours.
5United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our
Response, (Office of Publishing Services, USCCB, 1983).
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The chapter is able to examine some of the ethical issues arising from semi-
autonomous robots, most of which raise questions of virtue and vice. The earlier
data from Iraq and Afghanistan showed that significant violence is done to soldiers’
character in war; the question the section examines is whether the emotional and
epistemological distance that semi-autonomous war robotics offers is ameliorating that
violence, or swapping one kind of ethical damage for another. The chapter hesitantly
affirms the ethical use of semi-autonomous robots, while pleading for more data.
After a significant detour into machine learning techniques for context, the final
section of the paper attempts to adjudicate between two models of artificial consciences
— one, proposed by a team led by Patrick Lin, advocates a virtue-ethics based approach
based upon machine learning, while Ronald Arkin proposes a more deontological
model. I ultimately favor Arkin’s model, after examining some flaws in Lin’s model;
notably, that machine-learning techniques are spooky — they deliver superior results,
but when they fail, they fail both unpredictably and badly. Given that not all failures
are equivalent in wartime, I argue it is better to have a machine that fails more often,
but more predictably and more mercifully, than one which fails badly.
1.4 God in All Code: The Ignatian Spirituality of
Hacker Culture
The first section in the final chapter examines the foundational documents of modern
hacker culture, and attempts to draw parallels between them, with the hope of
initiating dialogue between these vital traditions of power and wisdom.
The second section examines notions of joy, both in hacker culture and in Ignatian
spirituality. The joy of constant play found in Raymond’s writings is juxtaposed
8
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against the Ignatian notion of moments of consolation. Both appear to have very
similar elements.
The third section deals with the Ignatian notion of mission, and how that contrasts
with the self-evident mission found in Hacker culture. The intense dedication of both
of their adherents are compared.
The fourth section deals with the teleological goal of the mission — Raymond’s
ethic of constant innovation, and Ignatius’s ethic of magis striving for perfection. More
similarities are uncovered.
Human relationality and service is examined in the fifth section. Jesuit commitment
to justice — particularly in the wake of superior general Pedro Arrupe. Hacker
commitment to shared labor is also examined.
Notions of formation are taken seriously in the final section. Both traditions are
shown to begin with a particular normative view of the human person, and develop
the person towards this aspiration.
9
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Chapter 2: Copylight of the World
2.1 Introduction
The evangelistic imperative is one of the defining features of Christianity. While each
major faith tradition proclaims its own truths to the world community in its own way,
no other major faith tradition, with the possible exception of Islam, has felt the need
to make its truths so widely accessible to everyone. Much of that imperative can be
attributed to the Great Commission, when Jesus commands the disciples to spread
the news of his resurrection. Perhaps its most famous formulation is in Matthew 28:
16The eleven disciples went to Galilee, to the mountain to which
Jesus had ordered them.
17 When they saw him, they worshiped, but they doubted.
18 Then Jesus approached and said to them, “All power in heaven
and on earth has been given to me.
19 Go, therefore, and make disciples of all nations, baptizing
them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the
holy Spirit,
20 teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you.
And behold, I am with you always, until the end of the age.”
Combined with the Pauline affirmation that the Gospel applies to all people
(hence disciples of all nations), Christianity formulated conceptions of evangelism and
missionary work. Within the Roman Catholic tradition, this usually takes the form of
emphasizing both sacred Scripture and sacred tradition1. Since the promulgation of
Dei Verbum, the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation in 1965, there hasn’t




Chapter 2: Copylight of the World
With the dawning of the digital age, the publishing industry is now undergoing
a huge revolution in their ways of doing business, with great uncertainty. This
uncertainty carries over into the 21st century, as new methods of spreading the Gospel
overtake reflection on those same methods. In particular, the thorny issue of copyright
law has left much of the online world scratching its head, and tying itself in knots.
In this essay, I’m going to examine how this debate affects our understanding of
evangelization in the 21st century. First, I will examine current theories of intellectual
property, and demonstrate why they are lacking when applied to scripture. I will
then attempt to posit an ethical solution, based on current (and, hopefully, future)
frameworks.
2.2 Case Description
The New American Bible (NAB) is the fruit of several decades’ worth of work by several
generations of scholars. Originally commissioned by the Confraternity of Christian
Doctrine (CCD), which, importantly, still holds the copyright, its administration
in the US has largely fallen to the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops
(USCCB) and, abroad, with the International Commission on English in the Liturgy
(ICEL), which is “[A] mixed commission of Catholic Bishops’ Conferences in countries
where English is used in the celebration of the Sacred Liturgy according to the Roman
Rite,”2 and coordinates translations of English liturgical works, including the Roman
Lectionary, which, in turn, includes its material from the NAB.
The ICEL maintains its copyright on the liturgical works, giving the following
rationale:
ICEL copyrights its texts in order to maintain under the civil law and
2International Commission on English in the Liturgy, ‘Welcome to ICEL’.
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international conventions the Church’s ownership of these texts used by
Catholics in their worship. The legal safeguard provided by copyrighting
the texts helps to preserve their literary and liturgical integrity under
the ecclesiastical authority given to the conferences of bishops by the
Second Vatican Council and by subsequent instructions of the Apostolic
See. Through copyright of its texts ICEL can also help to promote their
availability to all the English-speaking countries through the international
copyright conventions.3
The ICEL also collects royalties from publication of these works. Again, from the
ICEL:
As a nonprofit body at the service of the Church in the countries where
English is spoken, ICEL endeavors to conduct its program with just
remuneration for translators, editors, composers, consultants, and staff
and with expenditures directly related to liturgical purposes. To provide
a continuing source of revenue for ICEL’s current and future expenses in
developing liturgical materials, a royalty fee is charged to all publishers.
ICEL does not charge for the reproduction of its texts when they appear
in materials produced by individual parishes, schools, religious houses, and
the like for their private and non-commercial, nonprofit use. Even in such
cases, however, the requisite acknowledgment and copyright notice should
always appear.4
Finally, in an appendix to the policy (presumably part of the 2008 revision):
3International Commission on English in the Liturgy, Publication Policies of the International
Committee on English in the Liturgy, Inc. Revised edition. (2008), p. 4.
4Ibid.
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Use of ICEL Materials on Global Computer Networks
ICEL texts and translations that have been approved by the Confer-
ences of Bishops, have received the recognition of the Holy See, and have
subsequently been promulgated for use on the date established by the Con-
ferences of Bishops may be reproduced in a non-commercial site (“Site”)
on the global computer network commonly known as the Internet without
obtaining written or oral permission, subject to the following conditions:
1. There must be no fee charged to access the Site or any of the ICEL
translations, texts, or music, thereon;
2. The appropriate ICEL copyright acknowledgment must appear on
the first and last pages and/or frames within the Site displaying the
ICEL translation or text (see www.icelweb.org and click on “copyright
policies”);
3. The ICEL translations and texts must be followed exactly;
4. These policies do not grant a license to publish texts in any other
form or any other right in ICEL’s name and marks, and the Site
may not display the ICEL translations or texts or otherwise use the
ICEL name in any way that implies affiliation with, or sponsorship
or endorsement by, ICEL;
5. ICEL reserves the right to terminate or modify its permission to use
its translations and texts;
6. ICEL reserves the right to take action against any party that fails
to conform to these policies, infringes any of its intellectual property
rights, or otherwise violates applicable law.
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The USCCB, which administers the CCD’s copyright of the New American Bible,
however, has a very different set of copyright guidelines:
• No permission is required for use of less than 5,000 words of the
NAB in print, sound, or electronic formats (for web usage, see below)
provided that such use comprises less than 40% of a single book of
the Bible and less than 40% of the proposed work.
• Permission must be requested for use of more than 5,000 words from
the NAB (or when the use comprises more than 40% of a single book
of the Bible or more than 40% of the proposed work).
• A copy of the manuscript pages that contain Scripture selections
should be sent to [the Associate Director of Permissions]
• The Scripture citations should be highlighted and the reference cita-
tions must be clearly marked. The following information should be
included: title, publisher, publisher address, publisher contact name,
proposed publication date, print run, list price, length of work.
• Manuscripts may be accepted via e-mail with prior authorization. To
obtain authorization, please send an email to nabperm@usccb.org.
• Permission is no longer granted to reproduce the 1970 New Testament
(apart from in the Liturgy of the Hours).
• All quotations must be verbatim from the text, including capitaliza-
tion and punctuation. The poetic structure of some passages and
books written in verse (for example, Psalms, Wisdom, Isaiah, etc.)
must be preserved in verse as printed.
• The appropriate copyright acknowledgment must be given [as per a
given formula]
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The end result of all of this legalese, however, is quite confusing. In practical terms,
this means it is perfectly legal for one to view the NAB online, on a personal laptop,
or on Apple Computer’s new iPad, but if one were to download the text in order to
read it oﬄine, say on the train, is illegal copyright infringement. Surely, however the
confluence of the church and the state set the rules for reading the bible in the 21st
century, the presence or absence of a wireless signal shouldn’t make that difference.
2.3 Background: Justification for Intellectual Prop-
erty
How can one own an idea? Such a question has been raised in society since the time
of Gutenberg – and, until recently, had been more-or-less satisfactorily answered. The
advent of the internet, however, has changed the entire frame of the question. When
books, inventions, and other creative works heretofore were physical objects – things
that could be touched, made, and controlled by scarcity – society developed copyrights
and patents, which worked admirably. However, the digital revolution of the internet
changed the rules of the game when two major advances changed the nature of creative
works:
1. Creative works are digital – composed on computers. This means that a work
has gone from being markings on a piece of paper to being bits in a data stream.
It is therefore now possible to reproduce flawless copies of any work composed
on the computer. While this capability existed in the hands of book printers
up until now, the widespread adoption of computers and desktop publishing
has enabled even average citizens to produce work on the level of professional
typesetters.
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2. The internet connects personal computers together in a global network. While
the capability to move files from one computer to another was one of the first
major advances of the computer industry, Geography had heretofore posed
a definite limitation to any attempt to share files; Users could put a file on
portable storage media like a floppy disk, say, and share it with neighbors, but
only realistically able to share information between people who are geographically
close. Companies could control the distribution of software by being the only
people who could ship uses copies of software. With the advent of the internet,
however, works can now be placed online for anyone to access and copy.
This has thrown back open the question of intellectual property (IP) rights: are the
rights given by traditional intellectual property regimes morally legitimate? Some, like
noted activist and founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) Richard M.
Stallman argue that intellectual property rights, at least applied to software, constitute
a “betrayal”5 of other users; an idea which he calls “morally sickening” and argue
that “It is not ethical to use non free software.” Other authors, however, like Richard
Spinello6 argue that at least the idea of some sort of copyright is completely legitimate,
if not the current US copyright regime.
The debate appears to be somewhat intractable. However, in some ways, the
debate is also moot. It is highly unlikely that the logical conclusion of abolitionists
like Stallman’s reasoning will come to pass, and copyright will be abolished. The
debate, then, needs to be refocused — given that copyright exists, what is acceptable
conduct within this framework? What is the most morally superior way of conducting
oneself under the scheme? It is these questions which have the most direct bearing on
the question at hand, and deserve the most scrutiny.
5Anarcho Babe.
6Richard Spinello, Cyberethics: Morality and Law in Cyberspace, 3rd edition. (Jones and Bartlett,
2006).
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In order to deal with these questions, however, it is necessary to first examine what
justifications are given for IP rights in the first place in order to be able to adequately
answer the question. There are three sources for justifications of IP rights. Briefly,
they are:
1. A Lockean theory, commonly referred to as the Labor-Desert theory78910
2. A Hegelian theory, referred to as the Personality theory1112
3. A Utilitarian theory13
A brief discussion of the three follows.
2.3.1 Locke: Labor-Desert Theory
The Lockean argument is perhaps the one most documented. Briefly, the argument
emphasizes that Labor makes right – an agent has a legitimate claim to only that
which the agent works for.
Locke begins with a rights-based approach; declaring, as noted above, that everyone
has rights to life, liberty, and property. His main moral thrust comes in his assertion
that people are entitled to as much property as may be necessary to sustain themselves’
and their dependents’ right to life. (The text lends itself to a broader reading of
“sustenance” to include a modest, though not extravagant, living.) Locke also asserts
7Spinello (as in n. 6), p. 98.
8Justin Hughes, ‘The Philosophy of Intellectual Property’, The Georgetown Law Journal, 77
(1988):2, p. 296-329.
9Kai Kimppa, Problems with the Justification of Intellectual Property Rights in Relation to
Software and Other Digitally Distributable Media, Ph. D thesis, (Turku Centre for Computer Science,
2003), p. 59-75.
10Herman T. Tavani, ‘Locke, Intellectual Property Rights, and the Information Commons’, Ethics
and Information Technology, 7 June (2005):2.
11Spinello (as in n. 6), p. 99.
12Hughes (as in n. 8), p. 330-358.
13Spinello (as in n. 6), p. 100.
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that the earth was, originally, held by people in common; property rights derive from
people claiming certain small portions of land and other resources to exclude other’s
access to, thus increasing the number of people who can subsist on the remaining
common land. (Ironically, he essentially justifies private property on altruistic grounds.)
Locke derives his theory entirely from a supposition that all tangible property is
held in common; the Lockean argument for IP rights extends this to creating a parallel
immaterial commons14. One key feature of the immaterial commons, however, is that
every object in it is both unique and non-diminishing. Hamlet is only one particular
combination of words in the entire English language, and so can be said to be unique,
but my reading Hamlet does not prohibit my next-door neighbor from doing so as
well.
Hughes identifies two alternate readings of Locke’s theory:
1. Labor-Avoidance: This reading holds that labor is, by definition, an implicitly
unpleasant activity that people pursue only reluctantly. It is just, therefore that
those who labor be rewarded with the fruits that are thence derived. Applying
it to Hamlet Shakespeare deserves the IP right to Hamlet because writing plays
is painful (or, at least, less pleasant than alternate options).
2. Value-Added: Those whose labor creates value should be rewarded with its
profits. Rather than stressing the unpleasantness of the work, this theory stresses
the value that is created. Applying this to the Hamlet example, Shakespeare is
entitled to the IP rights to Hamlet not because it is painful to write plays, but
because Hamlet is a great play.
14Kimppa (as in n. 9), p. 64.
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2.3.2 Hegel: Personality Theory
The Hegelian15 position holds that an author invests some facet of the author’s
personality in all created works. The works created by a given author embody a part
of the author’s personality. Therefore, an author is entitled to some amount of control
over the created work.
Note that the IP rights associated with this theory are separate and distinct from
those associated with the Lockean argument. Rather than stressing compensation for
pain or value, the Hegelian instead demands veto power over derivative works, and
seeks to ensure that created works accurately reflect the author. Unlike either the
Lockean or the utilitarian, who argue that creation must be incentivized, the Hegelian
does so almost from a defensive posture – to define the agent itself concretely in the
world, rather than allow others to define the agent. This argument assumes that
creation will happen, and even encourages it, but insists that the rationale behind
creative works – a self-actualization solely by an agent – must remain only within the
agent’s sole control.
2.3.3 Mill/Bentham: Utilitarianism
The Utilitarian’s argument is perhaps the simplest of the three, and is most prominently
articulated in the US Constituion, which reads, in part “The Congress shall have
power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” (Art. I, §8, Cl. 8)
The utilitarian’s argument is merely that creating works takes time, and effort,
and without sufficient protection, authors will have no incentive to create, and will,
15Hughes (as in n. 8), p. 330-365.
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accordingly, not. Important to this idea is that creation: artistic, literary, scientific,
or technical, must be incentivized. Agents within the system do not create IP works
absent these incentives, because, economically, the “costs of expression” outweigh the
“costs of distribution” – in effect, because it does not make economic sense to create
IP works, agents will, accordingly, not create IP works. Because IP works are held
to be a nonmoral good, the utilitarian argues that the only moral route for society
is to give some sort of economic incentive for IP works to be created. Futher, the
utilitarian argues, the best method to incentivize the production of IP works is the
limited monopoly granted by IP rights; ergo IP works are moral.
2.4 Ownership of Scripture
Before we can examine the justification for Scriptural IP rights, we must first resolve
one important question: Who owns the Bible?
In a certain sense, this question is nonsensical — we certainly do not own the
Bible in the same way that we may own even original works. The ICEL gives the
following argument in answer to that question (emphasis mine):
[I]n order to maintain under the civil law and international conventions
the Church’s ownership of these texts used by Catholics in their worship.16
Thus, the ICEL contends that the Church owns the Bible. While this is a
superficially satisfactory answer, there are two deeper questions which lie beneath the
surface here. The first is who do we mean when we say “The Church”? Do we mean
all of God’s children (that is, the entirety of humanity?) Do we mean the Catholic
16International Commission on English in the Liturgy, Publication Policies of the International
Committee on English in the Liturgy, Inc. (as in n. 3), p. 4.
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Christian community? Or do we mean the institutional, teaching arm of the church
embodied in the Roman Magisterium?
The ICEL clearly has one particular view of the answer to this question. In the
ICEL’s view, the Bible belongs to the institutional Church. Yet, I think a stronger
case could be made for seeing church as a cipher for the entire people of God.
The case for such a view rests in view of St. John’s view of Christ the Word of God.
It has been understood since the earliest days of the church Christ came to redeem
all people, not merely the Jewish people. Thus, it is incumbent upon the Christian
Community, which has joyously received this news, to proclaim to the entire world
the good news of salvation in Christ. Insofar as Christ is the Word of God and is
himself the good news of salvation, then the Word of God belongs to all the people,
and all people belong to the Word of God.
However, the other question that must be answered is more subtle: is the word
“own” the appropriate use of the word in the context of Scripture? For the ICEL, the
answer is yes, but I confess that I am not quite sure.
It is clear that the Bible is a gift from God; however, as stated above, that gift,
if it “belongs” to anyone, belongs to the whole of God’s people. Yet, where is the
Christian community and the institutional Church in this conception? Surely, as the
people who recognize scripture as holy, they should have some place in this theoretical
conception?
My answer is yes, though the notion of stewardship. I argue that Scripture, like
Christ, is a gift which is beyond our power to hold. It is given to us, and it is at the
same time beyond us. Thus, it is given to the Christian community as an inheritance
held in trust for the whole people of God to claim.
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2.5 Scripture and IP Rights Frameworks
Given the brief systematic sketch, we should be able to determine which, if any, system
seems to make the most sense when applied to Scripture. Alas, despite the copious
detail of each framework, Scripture, taken seriously as the inspired Word of God does
not fit neatly into any one of these systems, as we will see.
2.5.1 Scripture and the Lockean Theory
The Lockean theory is based on two separate assumptions:
1. Ownership is in some way tied to labor (whether by the Labor-Avoidance theory
or the Value-Added theory.
2. Property is held in common until an individual claim supersedes on the commons.
Neither one of these statements is entirely defensible with regard to Scripture, but
the second is much more defensible than the first.
The notion that ownership is tied to labor prompts an examination of the question
what is labor regarding scripture? The immediate answer for most people will be
translation, and this is to be expected, given the intense amount of time, dedication
and effort that biblical scholars pour into every word (and, sometimes, every letter) of
the Bible in order to ensure as accurate a translation as possible. Yet, in our rush to
acclaim the translators, we must not forget the primary labor of creating the bible:
Authorship.
Authorship with regard to the Bible is a complex thing. Any Christian will answer
that the primary author of the Bible is God. Yet this is where the simplicity of the
question ends. The secondary authors of the texts are presumably the manuscript
authors themselves — St. Paul is rather straightforward, but also, if the documentary
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hypothesis is to be believed, the Yahwist, the Elohist, the Deuteronomist and the
Priestly source are the four main (if ill-understood) authors of the Old Testament. A
third level of authorship rests in the editors of the same works — the priestly editors
who laid out the Genesis story with two creation accounts clearly had some sort of
theological agenda in doing so, and by studying their revisions we can divine it.
Translators are yet another layer of abstraction added onto this complex animal, so
any work done by modern translators, even if they were working only with manuscript
texts and were not relying on any previous scholarship at all (a laughably na¨ıve
assumption), they would, at best, appear to be only at the fourth degree of removal in
this vast process of co-creation. Thus, while it’s clear that translators have some role
to play in determining the IP status of the bible, to grant to them all of the benefits
of several previous generations of scholarship and labor seems disingenuous.
Largely, this is due to the Lockean model’s understanding of labor and work — for
Lockeans, creation is like agriculture: A single person tills a field, plows, puts blood,
sweat, and tears into working to soil, and derives fruit thereby. In reality, the process
of translating the Bible isn’t like agriculture (or writing a novel) whose primary agent
is a single person with accompanying initiative, but is in fact closer to building a road:
later workers use earlier workers’ progress in order to get to their work; still later
workers will build on them.
The Lockean model’s other assertion is quite different, and much easier to harmonize
with the Christian tradition. We have already established that, within the Christian
tradition, the Bible is given to all people. This is quite comparable to Locke’s assertion
that all property is held, originally, in common. Indeed, in Locke’s original Second
Treatise on Government, begins with the assertion that everything is held in common
because it was given to humanity by God.
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It’s Locke’s second model — that individual claims, made to support oneself, can
supersede the commons, that this becomes an issue. The nature of immaterial works
is such that scarcity may only be artificially imposed. Thus, the ultimately altruistic
basis for Locke’s argument breaks down when dealing with immaterial things.
2.5.2 Scripture and the Hegelian Theory
The Hegelian theory is at once both the best and worst theory to apply to scripture.
Its set of concerns are closest to the Christian community’s concerns, and yet applying
it in the way it is applied to every other work would be a gross injustice to scripture.
The core of Hegel’s theory is that a work by an author is an expression of an
author’s personality in the world — an act of self-definition — and, therefore, IP
rights are an intrinsic component of personal liberty to define oneself. Leaving aside
the question of whether human beings can really define themselves, this is striking in
its resemblance to normal theological discourse about Scripture: the Word of God is
God’s self-revelation in the world.
Much of the Hegelian theory’s concerns mirror concerns of the Christian community.
Indeed, while Utilitarians and, to a lesser extent, Lockeans are concerned with deriving
economic advantage from their works, Hegelians are focused exclusively on concerns
of textual integrity. This mirrors ICEL’s reasoning (again, emphasis mine):
The legal safeguard provided by copyrighting the texts helps to preserve
their literary and liturgical integrity under the ecclesiastical authority
given to the conferences of bishops by the Second Vatican Council and by
subsequent instructions of the Apostolic See.17
17International Commission on English in the Liturgy, Publication Policies of the International
Committee on English in the Liturgy, Inc. (as in n. 3), p. 4.
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This is precisely what the bishops are trying to affirm: Textual integrity is
important, and, indeed, is why safeguards are kept on the text in the first place.
However, on a theoretical basis, this line of reasoning breaks down when applied
to anyone except God. A translation of many other works can be a work of art
itself — Robert Fagles’s Iliad, for example, is truly remarkable, and Sir David Ross’s
translation of the Nicomachean Ethics is still essential over 80 years after it was first
published in 1925 — that kind of personal shaping of the text that marks Fagles’s
and Ross’s work is precisely what modern Biblical commentators are attempting to
avoid. While eisegesis is inevitable, and exegesis always only a possibility, great care
and attention is given to make the translator’s work as transparent and unobtrusive
as possible. Thus, although translations can be judged and praised, they ultimately
should not be counted as primarily the work of the translator but rather of the original,
primary author, which, here, is God.
Alas, God cannot make copyright claims, and, despite some efforts, cannot be sued
either. Ostensibly, this is where the Church can step in. Yet, this is where the Church
must be very careful and very humble, if it can make this step at all — the entirety of
the Hegelian argument rests upon an author objecting to others’ use of the author’s
work, because, since a work is an extension of that person, those who use an author’s
work are compelling the author into undesired association.
Following that line of reasoning, the (presumably institutional) church, on behalf of
the Living God, would be claiming that God does not desire association with someone
else’s message. That’s an extraordinary claim, and it is not at all clear who would be
qualified to judge such a claim. Copyrights are currently administered through our
court system, but I can think of no Christian who would think that a court of law is
an appropriate place for a theological debate, much less one with the force of civil law.
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2.5.3 Scripture and the Utilitarian Theory
The Utilitarian theory is the most straightforward of all the theories, and the one
which is most oblique to scripture. However, it must be taken seriously, because our
current system of copyright law has taken this as its justification.
The Utilitarian holds that copyright is nothing more than economic incentive to
produce works. If people can’t derive economic advantage from producing, say, novels,
then fewer novels will be written. Since we want a socially optimal number of novels
to be written, we give people a temporary monopoly on their novel, in order to sell
them.
This produces many problems, which will be shown in a later section, but there is a
major problem with applying this conception to scripture. If the Christian community
has any sort of unified consensus about the Bible, it is surely that that the Bible is
not just another IP work. Indeed, Christians need no external incentive to produce
translations or commentary — indeed, the great commission makes it a religious
imperative. What this system may do, however, is make it possible to derive income
from copies of a religious text, although, as we will see
2.5.4 Scripture is its own Category
As we have seen, the notions of scripture categorized in section 2.4 fits into no
preconceived notion of IP rights. However, scripture does lend itself to its own set of
concerns for Christians, which will be important to our ethical determination:
1. Integrity. The Christian community broadly, and the Catholic Christian commu-
nity narrowly, are both very concerned to ensure the integrity of the scriptures.
Any legal protections applied
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2. Access. Christians are keen to ensure access to the scriptures for anyone who
would like them. While Catholic Christians are also key to ensure that appropri-
ate pastoral direction accompanies the scriptures (since Catholics do not have
the right of private interpretation), Catholics are just as eager as any other
Christian group to encourage the spread of God’s Word.
The key to our pastoral dilemma, then, is trying to fit these two major concepts
into how the ICEL, the NCCB, and other Catholic agencies which have control over
copyrights of the New American Bible and other scriptural contexts should conduct
themselves.
2.6 Comparison: ICEL vs. USCCB
The the ICEL and the USCCB both have copyright policies, as noted in section
2.2. What’s interesting is these policies are almost total inverses of one other. I will
examine possible motivations for this split, comment on the pros and cons of each
approach, and then make recommendations for synthesizing the two approaches.
2.6.1 ICEL
The ICEL is a cooperative body between conferences of bishops where English is the
primary liturgical language. Its explicit goal is to attempt to standardize, as much
as is pastorally possible, the liturgy between English-speaking countries, in order to
encourage solidarity between English-speaking countries, and a sense of community
with the wider church. Indeed, many smaller countries, or countries where English
is not the primary language of the liturgy, rely on larger countries (“publishing”
countries) to export liturgical books, and therefore discourage regionalism in order to
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minister pastorally to English speakers all around the globe.
In essence, ICEL is an organization founded on coordination and cooperation, and
their copyright policy reflects this focus. Their electronic copyright policy is quite
liberal, and allows essentially anyone to host a web version of any ICEL text. Thus, if
Boston College or another Catholic University (or, for that matter, anyone) decided it
wanted to host the text of the Roman Missal, it wouldn’t even have to ask permission
— they could proceed, so long as three salient points were followed:
1. No fee must be charged to access such a site.
2. ICEL’s copyright must be acknowledged.
3. The copy must be verbatim.
ICEL also essentially reserves the right to revoke this permission, if, say, an
anti-Catholic group decided to host material for the purposes of mockery.
ICEL’s approach has a number of benefits. Its approach maximizes interchange-
ability, at least between web-enabled computers, and grants maximum flexibility to
the faithful, and minimizes clerical oversight. Thus, if ICEL doesn’t have the time
or money to extensively police sites which would want to host the Roman Missal, it
can set broad guidelines, and only police those which abuse its liberal policy. The
downside, of course, is the other side of its upshot — where there is great freedom,
there is great possibility for abuse.
2.6.2 USCCB
The USCCB, unlike the ICEL, is not a grouping of bishops’ councils, but is a council of
bishops itself. Thus, the USCCB sees its primary job as pastoral direction, and exercise
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of the teaching arm of the institutional church. This orientation is also reflected in
their copyright policy, which they maintain over the NAB.
Unlike the ICEL, the USCCB maintains comparatively strict controls over use of
the NAB. While still liberal by many publishing houses’ standards, its controls are
quite strict:
• Only 40% of a work may consist of NAB material without written permission.
• No work can contain more than 40% of a given book of the bible (which means
that one couldn’t even include all of Obadiah’s denunciation of Edom).
• No one else may duplicate the work done at usscb.org, which includes
– Podcasting the NAB, or the Daily Readings
– Posting the complete NAB or the Daily Readings
The USCCB’s approach, then, is to keep as many things “in house” at usccb.org
as is possible. Presumably, this is because they have spent a great deal of time
maintaining a very complete and meticulous website. In a larger consideration, the
bishops view their teaching role as primary, and want to ensure that, when Catholics
look to scriptures, that they do so through the bishops.
This approach is consistent with the Catholic approach to scriptural understanding,
in that the Church is the primary locus of scriptural interpretation. However, this
approach has its limitations. Notably, the faithful who want an electronic version are
dependent upon either usccb.org. Those who want an electronic version in a format
other than standard HTML, or who want to read the Bible on their Kindle, or in
the full-screen version of their iPad either have to wait until a publisher produces
a particular version. Currently, Olive Tree Bible Software produces an (admittedly
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well-done, if expensive) NAB for the iPhone/iPad; Kindle users are, as of this writing,
out of luck.
The USCCB’s approach supports the integrity of the text, but at the expense of
access to the text. Contrary to ICEL’s opinion, the american bishops’ approach seems
to be “If you can’t do it well, don’t do it at all.”
2.6.3 Reconciliation
Each of the two approaches treats one of the Christian concerns, and favors it over the
other. While both approaches play to the strengths of the agency favoring it, there
may, in fact, be a superior option that incorporates both concerns better.
If priority must be given to either of the two concerns, it is better, I argue to
prioritize access. Mostly, this derives from theological concern — the great commis-
sion’s evangelistic imperative is clear and unambiguous, and I am convinced that the
pastoral support that an immediately accessible Bible would represent is a greater
contribution than a completely whole but utterly inaccessible one.
However, there is also a pragmatic dimension to such advice — US copyright
law is unabashedly utilitarian in its basis (although some proponents argue for its
strengthening on Lockean grounds), and many of the controls that the Hegelian
authors argue for are not only absent in US copyright law, the doctrine of fair use
carves out certain exceptions (e.g. the right of quotation, parody, etc.) which make
policing difficult, litigious, and ultimately a distraction to the work of spreading the
Gospel.
A third option is to take an approach which is similar to the ICEL approach, using
a selected license. Creative Commons, a foundation committed to offering alternatives
to full copyright claims. In particular, Creative Commons offers an “Attribution-
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Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0” license, which is a legal document giving
anyone the narrow freedom to make verbatim copies of a given work, provided it is
properly attributed, used for noncommercial purposes, and not used to create a new
work without the copyright holder’s permission. Such a middle way would strike, I
argue, the best balance between accessibility and integrity — the text could be moved
to whichever format is popular at the moment (.html, .tex, .epub, etc.), while still
forcing the text, as promulgated by the US bishops, to remain unaltered.
This does not mean, however, that the work of the USCCB should be wasted, or
that Catholics should not look to their bishops when interpreting Scripture. usccb.org
is one of the best Catholic websites on the web; it just shouldn’t feel that it must be








3.1 The Ontology of Goodness
Luciano Floridi’s Information Ethics project is based around a fundamental axiom: that
being has a fundamental value over non-being.1 At first glance, this assertion doesn’t
appear to be controversial, but the precise meaning of it reveals how extraordinary it
is. The salient definition of being here does not mean the binary condition of either
existing or not existing; rather, Floridi is viewing being through an Informational level
of abstraction. Information and being are correlated together — information here
meaning something more akin to “structured existence” rather than existence itself.
Floridi’s system has a base observation, and a basic value judgement, from which
it derives all further ethical conclusions:
1. Inforgs exist
2. Ceteris Paribus, this existence is a good thing
3. Therefore, existing inforgs have “a Spinozian right to persist in its own status,
and a Constructionist right to flourish, i.e. to improve and enrich its existence
and essence.2”
While it is true that all philosophy must begin from some postulates, and this is a
well-developed set of postulates, it is ultimately unsatisfying to the theologian. For a
Christian, God is both good and the source of goodness, so any reference to goodness
absent a reference to God is incoherent for a theologian.
Thankfully, however, Floridi’s second postulate isn’t difficult to connect with a
notion of God; indeed, it actually flows quite well from traditional understandings of
God, albeit understood in a new, informational way.




3.1.1 God the Sustainer
The metaphysical properties of God are a subject of considerable confusion and
controversy within Christian theology. While there are three major properties in the
traditional theistic formulation (omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence)
which have bedeviled believers tackling theodicy since the beginning of theological
discourse, there is another, less prominent attribute of God in the Christian tradition
which dovetails well with an informational perspective. This is God as sustainer —
the guarantor of being. In this view, existence itself is the result of the continuing
action of God. Since God’s actions are, by definition, good, existence is therefore
good. Taken informationally, this view means that information is nothing short of the
product of God’s actions, and, in some sense, the continuing presence of God.
This assertion is not given as much prominence in the west as it is in the east,
especially in Hinduism, where Lord Shiva’s primary attribute is the sustainer. However,
a Judeo/Christian version of this notion finds its basis both in Scripture and in the
broader tradition. St. Paul’s Speech in the areopagus in the Acts of the Apostles is
especially noteworthy:
For “In him we live and move and have our being”; as even some of your
own poets have said,“For we too are his offspring.” (Acts 17:28)
The context of this verse is Paul speaking to the stoic and epicurean philosophers
in Athens, proclaiming to them the gospel of Christ, whom he sees as the “unknown
God” which the Athenians have dedicated an altar to in the Areopagus. Paul brings a
Judaic reading to a quote from a (lost) Greek poem, and it is the final word of the
poem, “esmen” which is the crucial hook. While its proper interpretation of whether
or not it connotes participation or merely dependence3 on the divine life, either reading
3Luke Timothy Johnson; Daniel J. Harrington, SJ, editor, The Acts of the Apostles, Volume 5,
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adequately emphasizes God’s role as sustainer of being for this argument.
St. Augustine also mused on this topic in the opening paragraphs of his Confessions:
[S]ince without thee nothing would be which does exist . . . Therefore I
would not exist – I would simply not be at all – unless I exist in thee, from
whom and by whom and in whom all things are.4
Here, the Doctor of Grace is much more direct than St. Paul. He directly states
that his existence must be due to some minimal participation in the divine life. God’s
own action sustains Augustine’s being, and he credits God’s grace with sustaining his
own life. This is quite consistent with Augustine’s litany throughout the entire sum of
the Confessions that all goodness ultimately derives from God’s own actions.
3.1.2 Meonic Evil
The postive assertions are actually the contrapositives of Floridi’s main arguments.
While I have heretofore argued about Floridi’s positive assertions, most of his ontology
of Good has actually been an ontology of evil, or, more accurately, an ontology of
entropy, which he sees as synonymous with evil. Of his four famous laws, three are
all formulated to deal with minimizing entropy. This view is a platonic one, which
finds evil as the absence of being. Such a view is quite common in the Orthodox east,
where evil is said to be meonic, which is greek for “anti-being”5.
The whole sum of this theological reading gets at the core Floridi’s reasoned
critique of environmentalist ethics — that the kind of prima facie dignity granted to
Sacra Pagina, (Liturgical Press, 1992), p. 316.
4St. Augustine; Albert C. Outler, editor, Confessions and Enchiridion, Volume 7, Library of
Christian Classics, trans. by Albert C. Outler (Westminster Press, 1955) 〈URL: http://www.ccel.
org/ccel/augustine/confessions.html〉, pp. 16-17, I.ii.2.
5Stanley S. Harakas, Toward Transfigured Life: The Theoria of Eastern Orthodox Ethics, (Light
& Life Publishing Company, 1983), p. 34.
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life in environmentalism is quite proper, but that it doesn’t go far enough. Floridi
argues for moving the locus of ethical concern outward even farther than environmental
ethics has moved it. Environmentalism sought to move ethics from anthropocentrism
to biocentrism, Floridi’s argument is to move from biocentrism to ontocentrism. In
a purely secular arena, such an assertion may well be quite controversial, but in a
Christian setting, arguing that the presence of God is preferable to God’s absence —
the core of this reading of Floridi — is not only uncontroversial, it is tautological.
3.2 Homo Poieticus: Christianizing Floridi’s Philo-
sophical Anthropology
3.2.1 Floridian Anthropology
The definition of Good and Evil demonstrated in the previous section relates directly
to Floridi’s philosophical anthropology. Floridi first begins by examining a seemingly
marvelous property of living things, and humans in particular: we are able to, at least
locally, reverse entropy’s effects, and create order from disorder. Thermodynamically,
of course, this is impossible — expenditure of energy inevitably means that net disorder
increases. However, since Floridi means something more akin to the popular, rather
than the thermodynamic definition of entropy — a corruption of information, rather
than a measure of disorder — the gains we are able to make are real, albeit temporary.
In particular, this anti-entropic characteristic is the single most essential thing
about humanity. In particular, Floridi contends that there are three major ontic






The critical things about these powers is that they are ontic — that is, that they
represent an ability to affect the nature of things. Floridi’s critique of virtue ethics is
that it describes only what happens when these powers are reflexively directed, rather
than being extended outward towards society and the world at large. Ethics consist
not merely in proper formation of the self (egopoiesis), but also proper formation of
society (sociopoiesis) and perhaps even proper formation of the world at large — a
concept we will return to in a moment.
3.2.2 Christian Anthropology
As with many things dealing with a religion spanning three millennia, there is a great
deal of difficulty in making sweeping declarations about what a broadly “Christian”
anthropology is or might be. However, there are a few salient characteristics which can
be marshaled for the sake of this argument. A great deal of Christian anthropology
has been a continuing exegesis on Genesis’s creation narratives: the priestly account
(Genesis 1-2:4a), and the yahwistic account (2:4b-3:2). While most of modern biblical
scholarship holds that they were written by two different authors, and were later
combined by a later redactor, we can still assume that the two accounts, while separate,
both contain core points which must be harmonized in any coherent Biblical worldview,




The priestly account is notable for its heavy use of repetitious, liturgical language.
One of the refrains, which happens after almost every one of God’s creative acts, is
that “God saw that it was good.” Such an affirmation has been the source of notions
of the dignity of creation throughout most environmental theology. It is also the
foundational place for any theology of creation — at least at some point, creation was
good. The continuing question comes later, when trying to harmonize the Priestly
account with the yahwistic account: does the fall of man alter creation’s dignity?
While early christians may well have affirmed such a stance by following St. Paul,
and seeing anything worldly as in opposition to things of the sprit. However, modern
reflections have refined the understanding of the fall — while the sins of our forbears
may well have done violence to human nature, creation’s dignity wasn’t fundamentally
altered. With the previous discussion of the ontology of evil, it is easy to see how —
if part of that dignity is the continuing presence of God, then it is difficult to affirm
that anything can be completely corrupted, especially the inanimate.
Another major point is that God creates man in “our image and likeness.” While
legions of theologians have been trying to explicate the very mysterious phrase, it is
understood that this sets humans apart from the rest of the created order — only we
have been created this way, and there are is also an implication that such a state is
superior to other created beings. Accordingly, there is a tendency to see those things
which separate us from other “lower” beings as being constituent in what the image
and likeness of God is.
Finally, God says to human beings, “. . . [H]ave dominion over the fish of the sea
and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the earth.”
(Genesis 1:28). This passage, which at one point was interpreted to mean that the
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created world was created for humanity’s exploitation, more modern reflection has
replaced the notion of king (the logical antecedent to dominion) with the equally
biblical notion of steward. Humanity is therefore seen not as despots ruling over the
created order, but rather as viceroys, in place until the true king — Christ — returns.
Yahwist Account
The Yahwist account is the familiar story of the creation, flourishing, and eventual
downfall of the archetypal first humans, Adam and Eve. The fall is the great theological
grist of the passage, and arguably most of western theology has been continual
examination and reexamination of this passage’s connection to the Gospels. However,
the salient passage here is not the actual fall, but is considerably earlier in the story,
in Genesis 2:19. God, having decided that Adam needs a companion, brings all of
the animals to the (as yet unnamed) man. What happens next is one of the most
extraordinary things in the entire passage. God allows the man to call each beast by
a name that the man gives to it.
By any reckoning, this is a seriously important passage to the theological anthropol-
ogy of the Bible. God voluntarily relinquishes the authority to name his own creation,
and instead gives that authority to Adam. As usual in Biblical interpretation, there is
a deeper dimension to this act. Rather than giving to the man mere autonomy over
language (so that Adam would decide what he would call the animals; essentially a
form of taxonomic nominalism), God instead gives Adam control over what the name
the animal will actually have. Broader than the mere ceding of divine authority (and,
make no mistake, that is an enormous decision), is how this affects the character of
Adam, and, by the same theological extension that arrived at the doctrine of original
sin, humanity as a whole. In short, it is the beginning of Adam’s ontic powers.
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3.2.3 Reconciling the Floridian and Biblical accounts
God grants human beings authority in both the priestly account and the yahwistic
account. In the Priestly account, God says to human beings, “. . . [H]ave dominion
over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that
moves upon the earth.” (Genesis 1:28) The yahwistic account gives the power to
name (semantic authority) to Adam, which God voluntarily cedes to humanity. These
are also the only authority given to people in either account, so it is not a stretch
to assume that the “dominion” over creation given in the priestly account is deeply
related to the nominative authority granted in the yahwistic account.
The nominative authority granted to Adam must therefore be deeper than mere
language. Reflection on the meaning of the verb “to name” reveals that implicit in
semantic authority also includes the ability to categorize, to systematize, to order,
and to generalize — in short, to reason. Thus, implicit in Genesis’s nominative
authority is the gift of reason to human beings, something which must speak to
modern readers deeply. This also has deep ethical implications — reasoning, far from
being a theologically suspect activity, is, in a very profound sense, a constituent of
human flourishing, and therefore commanded by God.
This also dovetails well with the notion of ontic powers that Floridi attributes to
human beings. If we are able to affect things at a deeper level than mere linguistic
labels by means of reason, then it is perfectly rational to associate our semantic
authority with our ontic powers. In fact, this sort of semantic authority can be shown




While modeling is the second of Floridi’s three powers, it is easiest to tackle this first.
The most important notion one must remember about Floridi is that he is an epistemic
constructivist as well as an ethical constructivist. For Floridi, reality-in-itself is a
black box; its ultimate secrets fundamentally inaccessible to us. However, using the
celebrated method of levels of abstraction, we can construct models of reality. While
our models are not guaranteed to be true in the sense of corresponding to ultimate
reality (thus retaining epistemic fallibilism), our models can be built and refined to
correspond to observable reality at a given level of abstraction. Newtonian physics as a
model for reality is quite consistent with reality at a human-scale level of abstraction,
but breaks down at the cosmic and the quantum scale. Likewise, special relativity
and quantum mechanics are (developing) models of reality at their respective levels of
abstraction. Thus, when Floridi grants to humans the ability to model, what he is
really granting is an epistemic ability. To be able to model is to be able, in whatever
sense the word can be applied, to know. Therefore, the assertion that humans have
a unique ability to model is a restatement of our ability, unique among inforgs, to
understand our surroundings.
This epistemic step is the one most intimately connected with our semantic
authority, since the ability to use language is what gives us this ability to reason in
the first place. Models, in large part, are semantic objects — they are constructed
out of language — be that language mathematical or prosaic. An authority based
in language as a divine gift leads directly to a unique epistemic access to a closer
approximation of truth.
This also provides a convenient demarcation line between human beings and other
inforgs — artificial and natural alike. While artificial agents can be models themselves
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(e.g. a weather forecasting computer model), the kind of privileged epistemic access
that allows meaningful information to be gleaned from such a model is reserved
to humans alone. As a result, moral responsibility — as Floridi has maintained —
remains with humans alone. On the other hand, moral accountability — the ability to
produce entropy, and therefore evil — is not contingent on understanding or intention,
and can therefore be attributed to artificial agents.
Control
From understanding comes control. It’s important to differentiate here between
two types of control. Obviously, all inforgs have some limited ability to affect their
environment; without it, they could not be dynamic organisms — at best, they would
be mere passive participants in the world around them. But there remains a difference
between the limited control that most inforgs are able to exert over their environment,
and the deeper control that humans have, which derives, ultimately, from our semantic
authority.
Our models — an ability proper only to human beings — grant us a similarly
privileged, albeit limited, ability to control our environment. All living things, for
example have the ability to search and hunt for food, but humans have a detailed
model of ecology and agriculture, which allows human beings to appropriately alter
our environment to grow our own food. Without understanding, the ability to
control that inforgs have is severely curtailed. Indeed, much of this control — or, in
Biblical language, dominion — ultimately derives from our ability to understand our




The final power Floridi attributes to human beings is creation. In many ways this
element of creation is both the source of his name for humans (homo poieticus), but is
also more profound than that. Creation is also the final extension of human beings’
powers of control. While a sufficiently detailed model of agriculture is enough to
tend a small vegetable garden and make it prosper with merely rudimentary tools,
modern agriculture is a truly extraordinary effort, which requires very sophisticated,
monumental tools. For this, we need machines — other inforgs — whose sole purpose
is to accomplish the task we have set out to do in accordance with our model. Thus,
our powers of control are most augmented by our ability — unique among inforgs —
to spawn separate inforgs to accomplish our goals.
This seems straightforward enough — after all, in order to plow a field, humanity
first used crude tools, then used those same tools to fashion better tools, and so
on. Sharpened sticks gave way to plows, which in turn gave way to specialized
tractors, which can plow extraordinary expanses at once. But this seems to stretch our
theological definition — semantic authority may well account for our ability to model,
and through those models, control. But from where comes our ability to create?
The answer is, in short, semantic authority doesn’t guarantee our ability to create.
What does allow us the ability to create is our creation in the image and likeness of
God. God is the first creator, and, as discussed before, existence is, at some minimal
level, the continuing presence of God. Therefore it makes sense that semantic authority
would not enable creation, since it is a theological tautology that only God can make
God present in the world.
This does run against some currents in Floridi; indeed, his Homo Poieticus was
initially developed as a response to modernism’s proclamation of, among other things,
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the death of God6. This is rather problematic for those who reject the divine obituary.
However, it need not be cause for abandoning the project of harmonization. It simply
requires a reframing of human capacities. Christians must reject the notion of humans’
being a demiurge – though Floridi emphasizes the original, Platonic meaning of the
word, it is difficult to see how flawed humanity would not ultimately become demiurges
more in line with the Gnostic conception. However, the same sentiment — a kind of
radical awakening to agency, on a scale not dissimilar to the Enlightenment motto
sapere aude, can still be taken to heart, albeit with a motto like concipere aude. Rather
than taking God’s place due to a vacancy in the office of Creator, we must awaken to
our own radical agency alongside God in bringing about the Kingdom of God.
What it means to be created in the image and likeness of God is an ability to
participate, in some way, in the divine life. Given a standard trinitarian description of
the Trinity as comprised of Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier, participation in the
Divine life allows human beings to be co-participants in these three divine activities —
creation, redemption, and sanctification. Creation we have explored here; redemption
and sanctification we will explore in the next section.
3.3 Cosmopoiesis: The Information Ethics Teleol-
ogy and Eschatology
Having established a solid ontology of goodness, as well as an anthropology, we can
now tackle two separate but intimately related topics: the eschatology and teleology
of the information ethics project.
As with the theological anthropology, we must first establish two separate escha-




tologies: Floridi’s, and a traditional Christian view, and then seek to harmonize the
two.
3.3.1 Information Ethics Eschatology
The information Ethics eschatology primarily deals with entropy. While Floridi has
said repeatedly that IE’s conception of entropy is not the technical definition, the
similarities are marked and intentional. In both cases, entropy is “fated to win” —
that is to say, all order, and thus all information, will (eventually) be destroyed on a
cosmological time scale.
In Floridi’s understanding, however, this ultimately pessimistic stance is not, in
fact, a cause for nihilism. Rather, our moral agency as sentient inforgs confer upon us
a special status. There are two wrong ways for anti-entropic agents to understand
Entropy’s inevitable victory. They can passively accept the death of the Universe
as inevitable and unchangeable fact, and therefore not worthy of effort to ontically
change. This might prompt a terrifying sort of Nietzchean nihilism. Conversely, it
could also prompting a vain effort to prolong the death of the universe. To quote
Dylan Thomas, these agents should
Do not go gentle into that good night.
Rage, rage against the dying of the light.
For Floridi, both approaches are wrong. The proper way is to help to facilitate
this death in the most gracious way possible. Ethics, then, is a sort of ars moriendi
for the universe — comparable to Jeremy Taylor’s famous Holy Dying. Since failure is
inevitable, the important thing is graceful failure of the universe. In this sense, the
anti-entropic agent isn’t trying to remove all entropy from the infosphere, since that,
writ large, is impossible. Rather, the anti-entropic agent’s goal is to target her (limited)
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ontic powers to ensure that the failure of some inforgs does not catastrophically impact
others.
3.3.2 Christian Eschatology
Like the previous discussion of Christian anthropology, it is difficult to come to any
sort of concrete points of agreement within a movement as diverse, and as old, as
Christianity. eschatology, however, is uniquely difficult to generalize; while everyone
agrees that anthropology is a critical topic, because of its direct effects upon the
most critical subject of all in Christian Theology — soteriology. However, the relative
importance of eschatology, especially cosmic eschatology as opposed to personal
eschatology, is a matter of debate.
The concerns about eschatology, if not the systematization thereof, was clearly
very important to the early church, which, following St. Paul, expected the second
coming in the imminent future. Sts. Peter and Paul both fully expected to see Christ’s
return within their own lifetimes, and some of their admonitions (especially Paul’s),
reflect that fact. Indeed, it’s not difficult to see how a simple reading of the gospel
would give a great deal of credence to that reading.
However, as time went on, it became clear that the parousia was not quite as
imminent as early Christians believed. Indeed, much of the interest in the Cosmic
eschatology was shaped by intense persecution, and a desperate desire to see divine
retribution for a litany of heinous crimes. As Christianity went from being outlawed
to officially sanctioned with Constantine’s conversion in 312, and from sanctioned to
established with the edict of Thessalonica in 380, Christianity underwent a radical
change.
As Christendom became the official religion of the Roman empire, injustices did
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not cease, but the people committing them did. Thus, Christian longing for a great
righting of wrongs changed from wanting God to judge a whole city or nation of
oppressors (i.e. Pagan Rome) to wanting God to judge individual oppressors (i.e. a
cruel magistrate, etc.); As a result, emphasis shifted away from a cosmic eschatology
— the great final judgement, where Christians as an oppressed minority would be
vindicated — to a personal judgement — where believers would be vindicated as part
of a victorious collective; the church militant.
This split in emphasis persists into the modern day, where two separate groups of
Christians have two very different views on the importance of cosmic eschatology —
Evangelicals, broadly, tend to see the cosmic apocalypse as a very important topic for
reflection, going into great detail about theories like “the rapture,” and even going
so far as to explore that theme in a series of popular novels.7 Mainline Protestants
and Catholics, on the other hand, tend to focus on individual questions of salvation;
and see the interpretation of apocalyptic prophecy as a difficult business, and not one
terribly relevant to the life of the church.
Thus, since consensus is difficult to find, the only real concrete point of agreement
in cosmic eschatology seems to be the anticipation, however distant, of a concrete,
temporal end of history. Indeed, parts of the Synoptic gospels (c.f. Matthew 24:43-44;
25:1-13) seem to indicate this, as well as St. Paul’s writings (I Thessalonians 4:13-18)
seem to indicate that, at some point in the hazy, indistinct future, there will be a
second coming, and a specific time at which history will end.




3.3.3 Harmonizing Information Ethics and Christian Escha-
tology
Coming to a harmony between these two points of view is difficult, since philosophical
reasoning about the end of history is necessarily speculative, and prophecy interpreta-
tion is difficult to do even in retrospect, let alone in prospect. Thus, it’s difficult to
say anything with certainty about the ultimate fate of the universe.
However, such definitive statements are not what is required in order to be a
Christian information ethicist. Rather, it is only sufficient to show that the two views
do not contradict one another, and that it is therefore possible to affirm both at
the same time. The best way to do this is to show how the Christian view can be
compatible with the information ethics view.
Although it is easy enough to conclude from the Parable of the Virgins (Matthew
25:1-13), and, especially, the Parable of the Thief (Matthew 24:43-44), that Christians
are to expect an unexpected parousia, one major verse within Matthew’s apocalyptic
discourse seems to contradict that view: “Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my
words shall not pass away.” (Matthew 24:35)
In the context of the apocalyptic discourse, it serves as a highlight to the major
emphasis of the passage — that the second coming’s arrival cannot be predicted; the
Matthean Jesus even goes so far as to say that no man knows the time of the parousia,
and implies that even he doesn’t know the time of the arrival (Matthew 24:36). By
indicating that heaven and earth — here taken to mean the whole of creation — will
pass away, Matthew’s author seems to allow that the parousia may well be delayed
until the end of time as we understand it.
So, if we permit that the delay of the parousia may well arrive at the triumph
of entropy, how does this affect the ethical life of the Christian? Can the notion of
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palliative care for the universe developed by Floridi be reframed in Christian terms?
And whence the Resurrection?
Both of these concepts can be explained with reference to the anthropology
developed in the previous section. As beings created in the image and likeness of God,
we are imperfect co-participants in the divine life. We have already shown how we are
co-participants in the divine life of the Creator; the important question now is how
we are co-participants in the divine life of the Redeemer and the Sanctifier.
In order to be able to adequately argue that we can be co-participants in this way,
it is better to understand, informationally, what we mean by these terms. Redemption
is fundamentally concerned with the idea that, in the primeval disobedience, humanity
lost its connection with the divine (as described in the Yahwistic creation story
above). While in the past, the primeval disobedience had been blamed for introducing
evil writ-large into the cosmos, more recent reflection along with the environmental
movement has reaffirmed the dignity of creation, and has therefore limited most of
the spiritual violence associated with the primeval disobedience has been primarily
confined to humanity. Redemption, then, is the divine process of restoring what was
lost as a result of the primeval disobedience. Our participation in the divine life of
the Redeemer (the second person of the trinity) amounts to the role of our free will in
our own salvation — a topic which has been far more extensively covered by far more
eloquent theologians.
The life of the Sanctifier, on the other hand, is much more interesting from an
informational point of view. Sanctification, unlike redemption, applies to all inforgs,
rather than just humanity. Sanctification — the process of becoming more holy — is a
process of becoming closer to God. Since we have already identified that at least part
of that participation is the literal presence of God in the world as expressed through
inforgs’ structured existence, this leads to the synergy between the Information Ethics
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approach and the theological approach — that our participation in sanctification is
the removal of entropy and the expansion of structured existence and, therefore, divine
presence.
This provides a theological grounding to Floridi’s four laws, provided that Sanctifi-
cation, or at least our own participation in such, is regarded as an imperative. Such
an imperative can be grounded in, and is at least part of, the true meaning of the
evangelical imperative that the Gospel imposes upon the faithful. However, the true
depth of such a conviction is broader than it may appear at first blush. Floridi’s
ontocenric ethic has much to teach a tradition which has traditionally framed its
questions in anthropocentric terms. However, Floridi’s work also exploded the proper
scope of ethical action. Far from merely trying to shape ourselves, our family, our
society, or even our planet, the proper locus of ethical concern is the infosphere, or, in
theological terms, the entirety of creation.
This is the real extraordinary leap that Floridi’s ethics can teach us. The explicit
refocusing of ethical concern to include the whole of the created order is almost
unprecedented, and Floridi is certainly the first to develop a philosophy which has
made such case explicit. The best distillation is from the late Romanian Orthodox
priest Ion Bria: “The cosmos is becoming ecclesia”8.
Such a formulation encapsulates the essence of Floridi’s project — the proper
understanding of ethics is not merely the proper formation of the self, or society, or
even biosphere. Since ethics should be ontocentric, the proper understanding of ethics
is the proper formation of the created order itself. Such a notion gives rise to its own
term — not egopoiesis, or biopoiesis, but cosmopoiesis.
8Emphasis in original; Stanley S. Harakas, Toward Transfigured Life: The Theoria of Eastern
Orthodox Ethics, (Light & Life Publishing Company, 1983), p. 31
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Mercy and Justice in Robot Ethics:
A Christian Approach
Power without love is reckless and abusive, and love without power
is sentimental and anemic. Power at its best is love implementing
the demands of justice, and justice at its best is power correcting
everything that stands against love.
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or Community?
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4.1 Introduction
We are entering a new age of warfare. While the ages of the archer, the knight, the
cannon, the bomber, and the nuclear warhead have each in turn presented themselves
to humanity, we are entering the age of a new type of weapon: the robot.
Robots have been a staple of science fiction since at least the 1920s, when Karel
Cˇapek coined the term in his play R.U.R. (Rossum’s Universal Robots), but the idea
of an artificial human being goes back at least as far as they myth of Talos (τ α´λως),
the man of bronze who guarded the island of Crete from the argonauts.
Despite dreams that such artificial warriors or mechanical marines might actually
supplant traditional armed forces, this reality is only now coming to fruition. The
reasons for this delay are manifold — the difficulty of making delicate computer
systems sufficiently rugged to exist within the harsh environments of the battlefield, the
difficulty of certain computer problems, and the expense, until recently, of processors
capable of handling such problems in a reasonable amount of time. However, at the
dawn of the 21st Century, the barriers to robots on the battlefield finally appear to be
coming down.
The Christian community has had a long history of influential reflection on war and
peace. Indeed, even avowedly secular philosophers cite church fathers like Augustine
when trying to comment on contemporary developments at the Pentagon. More
recently, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, at the height of the cold
war, released the pastoral letter “The Challenge of Peace1,” dealing with the horror of
the nuclear arms race — an example of political religion which helped to turn public
opinion, broadly speaking, against unbridled accretion of nuclear arms.
This paper will attempt to bring a Christian perspective to troubling ethical
1United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (as in n. 5).
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questions raised by the use of robotic warfare. In particular, we will consider the
following major questions and sub-questions in turn:
1. Are Semi-Autonomous robots ethical to deploy on the battlefield?
(a) If so, how can they be ethically deployed?
2. Are Autonomous robots ethical to deploy on the battlefield?
(a) If so, what architectural constraints should be placed upon their design to
ensure an ethical robot?
4.2 Christian Foundations
Before going too deeply into the topic at hand, it is necessary to clarify a few things
from the beginning.
First, the Christian tradition, like any tradition that spans millennia, does not
speak with one voice on matters of peace and war. Indeed, there are three distinct
Christian perspectives on war and peace2, each of which draws on a separate part of
the tradition:
1. Holy War, or Christian Triumphalism
2. Christian Pacifism
3. Just, or Limited War
4.2.1 Holy War
Some voices in the Christian tradition have seen it as endorsing violence in certain
situations. Drawing on Old Testament sources which portray Yhwh as a mighty
warrior, as well as apocalyptic literature on the New Testament3, some Christians view
2James A. Reimer, Christians and War: A Brief History of the Church’s Teachings and Practices,
(Fortress Press, 2010).
3Ibid., pp. 17-19, 36-39.
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war as a positive thing, embodying the struggle of righteousness against corruption.
Historically, this line of thinking reached its apogee in the Crusades — a series of
theopolitical wars launched by Christian europeans in the 11th , 12th , and 13th century
against the Muslim inhabitants of present-day Israel/Palestine.
However, growing modern consciousness about the horrors of war — especially in
the aftermath of the first and second world wars, and the enormous casualties that
resulted — have qualitatively changed the religious and political discourse surrounding
war, especially in the United States, the world’s sole remaining superpower4. In
modern America, this kind of Christian triumphalism is usually limited to conservative
Evangelical protestants. In the face of the extended conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan,
even evangelical thought may well be shifting. The extreme limitations of this view,
then, prevent it from being the basis upon which this paper can be based.
4.2.2 Christian Pacifism
Diametrically opposed to Holy War is the viewpoint of Christian pacifism. These
Christians take Jesus’s admonition to turn the other cheek5 quite literally, and argue
that it is morally indefensible to pursue violence of any kind – whether offensive or
defensive, retaliatory or peremptory.
Like the crusader point of view, this view has traditionally been held by a minority
of Christians throughout history, most recently by the Mennonites, Quakers, and other
anabaptist groups. Indeed, many of these smaller groups oppose extensive involvement
between Christians and the wider society, adopting the model of what H. Richard
Niebuhr called “Christ against culture,” and tend to regard violence as the inevitable
result of attempting to mix the fundamentally incompatible demands of Christianity
4Lisa Sowle Cahill, Love Your Enemies: Discipleship, Pacifism, and Just War Theory, (Augsburg
Fortress, 1994), p. 1-14.
5c.f. Matt. 5:39
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and government.
Unlike the triumphalist position, which has largely fallen out of favor in the wake
of WWI and WWII, Christian pacificism’s voice has only gotten stronger. While
still a minority position, the arguments of Christian pacifism have convinced notable
ethicists like Lisa Sowle Cahill that the only two defensible stances of Christians
and war are pacifism or a limited war view. Even the Roman Catholic Church, the
birthplace and bastion of the just war view, have voiced respect for the strength of
Christian pacifist’s convictions.6
However, to adopt this view is ultimately to abdicate pastoral responsibility for
guidance on the use of force. In some cases, this can be justified — the United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops, in their letter The Challenge of Peace7 famously
adopted what is essentially a pacifist stance on the use of nuclear weapons, declaring
that nuclear weapons so grossly violate the principle of proportionality inherent in
just war theory that they could not be used justly, and they therefore declined to
give guidance on their appropriate deployment; instead arguing only for an absolute
prohibition on their use and for gradual worldwide nuclear disarmament.
The salient question regarding robotic ethics, then, is whether the use of robots
poses such a grave threat that pacifism is the only ethical alternative. This is a
contested question, and serious voices, including Peter Asaro, Noel Sharkey, and
Robert Sparrow8 have argued that there are such issues.
6United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (as in n. 5), ¶119, p. 37.
7Ibid., ¶142-177, pp. 44-56.
8Asaro; Noel Sharkey, ‘Cassandra or False Prophet of Doom: AI Robots and War’, Intelligent
Systems, 23 (2008):4; Robert Sparrow, ‘Killer Robots’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 24 (2007):1
〈URL: http://www.sevenhorizons.org/docs/SparrowKillerRobots.pdf〉.
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4.2.3 Just, or Limited War
The final position, and the one which has the widest acceptance, is the notion of just
or limited war. Fundamentally, the Just War theorist argues that, at least in certain
situations, war is ultimately the lesser of two evils. While the just war theorist does
not celebrate war in the manner of the triumphalist, and views violence as at least
prima facie morally unacceptable, but perhaps necessary by the principle of minus
malum.
Furthermore, just war theory prescribes certain constraints on warfare in order to
circumscribe its destructiveness (hence, the limited war sobriquet). Modern just war
theory has three major branches:
Jus Ad Bellum — Proper conduct in the declaration of war
Jus In Bello — Proper prosecution of war itself
Jus Post Bellum — Proper conclusion of war and reestablishment of peace
While the ethics of robots touch all three options, this paper will focus on Jus
In Bello concerns. Within Jus in Bello, there are three major criteria according to
traditional theory9, with the recent addition of a fourth10:
1. Commensurability of Means to Ends
2. Proportionality of Means to Ends
3. An Absolute Prohibition of targeting Noncombatants
4. Respect for International Law
Overall, this principle is an attempt to balance justice — the defense of the weak,
and a respect for, and pursuit of, the common good — with the demands of mercy,
9St. Thomas Aquinas; Kevin Knight, editor, Summa Theologica, trans. by Fathers of the English
Dominican Province Second and Revised edition. (1920) 〈URL: newadvent.org/summa/〉, Secunda
Secunda Partis, 40, 1.
10Reimer (as in n. 2), p. 74.
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which far beyond mere clemency, is the responsible use of power by those who have it.
Thus, just war is always a delicate balance — an attempt to always choose the lesser
evil, and balance justice and mercy.
The question before us, then, is which stance to take: pacifism, or just war?. Two
major guides are instructive. First, robotization appears to be inevitable, and so
to adopt a pacifistic stance toward robotic warfare is, to quote William F. Buckley,
“standing athwart history yelling ‘Stop!”’ This is not necessarily a bad thing — the US
bishops famously could find no adequate justification for the use, or even the threat to
use nuclear weapons11, and therefore tolerated them as a deterrent only under duress,
and advocated drawdown and eventual disarmament. With the collapse of the Soviet
Union, the sole justification for the United States’ extensive nuclear stockpile has
collapsed along with it, and the bishops now advocate nuclear drawdown.
However, robotic warfare does not appear to present the same sorts of challenges
that nuclear weapons do. The bishops’ principal objection to nuclear weapons was
how seemingly disproportionate they were, as well as their indiscriminate nature, both
of the weapon itself as well as the inevitable fallout. However misguided the attempt
to build a mechanical marine may be, it does not appear, prima facie to present the
same sort of risk of indiscriminate destruction that characterizes nuclear weapons.
With this in mind, to adopt a pacifist stance and declare these weapons verboten
appears to be somewhat misguided, as well as an abdication of pastoral duty. The
drive for mechanization does not happen in a vacuum, and while these weapons
present ethical challenges, they also improve upon earlier weapons — something we
will examine later in the paper. For the moment, then, this paper will assume a just
war stance for pragmatic, pastoral reasons.
11United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (as in n. 5), p. 44-56.
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4.3 The Problem
Why mechanize the army at all? Why spend billions of dollars in order to build
machines which do the jobs of regular soldiers? One reason among many, but the one
most often cited by proponents of mechanization, is that Jus in Bello is difficult, and
seemingly getting harder.
In 2006 and 2008, the US Surgeon General’s office commissioned two major reports
from the Mental Health Advisory Team on the mental health of soldiers in Iraq during
the years 2005-200712 and 2006-200813, respectively. For the first time in a conflict
since WWII, the team examined unethical behavior in Soldiers and Marines, and the
results were disturbing.
As is evident from the figures, the attitude of soldiers and marines toward non-
combatants (Iraqi civilians) as well as their behavior speaks volumes about how even
the most well-trained military in the world has difficulty prosecuting war ethically.
It is in the face of this situation — the fact that even a highly-trained, professional
military has difficulty conducting war ethically, that the advocates of robotic war step
to the forefront. They claim that passionless robots, not animated by the dreadful
human impulses toward revenge or bloodlust would allow war to become more surgical,
more precise, and, hence, more ethical1415.
The question this chapter will scrutinize, then, is the claim that robots can, in
some circumstances, act more morally than humans, or at least allow humans to act
12Office of the Surgeon Multi-National Force-Iraq and Office of the Surgeon General, United States
Army Medical Command, Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) IV: Operation Iraqi Freedom 05-07,
(United States Army, November 2006) – Technical report.
13Idem, Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) V: Operation Iraqi Freedom 06-08, (United States
Army, February 2008) – Technical report.
14Ronald C. Arkin, Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous Robots, (Chapman & Hall, 2009),
p. 29-36.
15John P. Sullins, ‘RoboWarfare: can robots be more ethical than humans on the battlefield?’
Ethics and Information Technology, 12 (2010):3 〈URL: http://goo.gl/aMOcj〉.
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All non-combatants should be treated with dignity and respect 
All non-combatants should be treated as insurgents
Torture should be allowed if it will save the life of a Soldier/Marine
Torture should be allowed in order to gather important info about insurgents
I would risk my own safety to help a non-combatant in danger











Percent Agree or Strongly Agree (Marines)
Percent Agree or Strongly Agree (Soldiers)
Figure 4.1: Soldier and Marine attitudes towards the treatment of insurgents and
non-combatants (MHAT IV)
Insulted/cursed at non-combatants in their presence
Damaged/destroyed Iraqi property when it was not necessary
Physically hit/kicked non-combatant when it was not necessary
Members of unit modify Rules of Engagement in order to accomplish mission
Members of unit ignore Rules of Engagement in order to accomplish mission











Percent Reporting One or More Times (Marines)
Percent Reporting One or More Times (Soldiers)
Figure 4.2: Soldier and Marine battlefield ethical behaviors. (MHAT IV)
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more morally in war than they do at present.
4.4 Autonomous vs. Semi-Autonomous Robots
There is a major division in wartime robotics — semi-autonomous robots, and au-
tonomous robots. It is important to be clear about what we mean by the word
autonomous in this context. While it normally refers to a moral agent, in this context,
it refers to a robot’s ability (or lack-thereof) to perform actions apart from a human’s
direct intervention.
As Sparrow16 helpfully points out, Autonomy is not a trinary condition (not
autonomous, semi-autonomous, autonomous), but is rather a spectrum; a robot can
be said to be more autonomous than another robot by comparing the length of time
it can function without human intervention.
For the purposes of this work, I define the terms as follows:
Semi-Autonomous Robot: A semi-autonomous robot is one which requires a hu-
man tele-operator, but can take simple directions without direct human interven-
tion. An example is the infamous Predator drone currently in use in Pakistan —
while it needs a human to activate its weapons manually, it is capable of flying
according to a set of GPS coordinates without human intervention. This ability
allows a single pilot to be able to man several drones at once; giving the pilot
the ability to survey many different areas and, if necessary, conduct several air
strikes in quick succession.
Autonomous Robot: An autonomous robot is one which is designed to operate
away from a human operator for a matter of hours, and be empowered to
16Robert Sparrow, ‘Building a Better WarBot: Ethical Issues in the Design of Unmanned Systems
for Military Applications’, Science and Engineering Ethics, 15 (2009):2.
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make kill-decisions on its own. No such robot currently exists in a battlefield
environment; however they are acknowledged to be in active development.
4.5 Ethical Issues in Semi-Autonomous Robots
Not all Semi-Autonomous robots are ethically controversial; robots used for bomb-
disposal, for example, appear to be utterly uncontroversial, and perhaps even morally
superior to putting humans needlessly at risk.
Most of the ethical issues raised in Semi-Autonomous robots focus on their ability
to take direction from a pilot who can be extraordinarily distant — most of the drone
strikes currently being conducted in Pakistan are being piloted from Creech Air Force
Base outside Las Vegas, Nevada; a distance of about 7,750 miles from their intended
target.
On the one hand, proponents17 argue that a semi-autonomous robot’s controller
would be unaffected by human urges of anger, revenge, or bloodlust. Opponents are
frightened by the same emotional disconnect18, arguing that this disconnect could
produce an airman numb to the horrors of war. Ethical questions, then, turn on
questions of virtue and character.
It is clear from the MHAT data that extended deployments do violence to soldiers’
character. Longer deployments and combat experience correlated positively both to
mental illness and to unethical behaviors19. Furthermore, an insurgency necessarily
instills in soldiers a sort of paranoia that anyone they see could be working among
17Arkin, Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous Robots (as in n. 14).
18James Detert, Linda Klebe Trevino and Vicki Sweitzer, ‘Moral Disengagement in Ethical Decision
Making: A Study of Antecendents and Outcomes’, Journal of Applied Psychology, 93 (2008):2; Lambe`r
Royakkers and Rinie van Est, ‘The Cubicle Warrior: the Marionette of Digitalized Warfare’, Ethics
and Information Technology, 12 (2010):3 〈URL: http://goo.gl/ZuByu〉.
19Office of the Surgeon Multi-National Force-Iraq and Office of the Surgeon General, United States
Army Medical Command, ‘Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) IV: Operation Iraqi Freedom
05-07’ (as in n. 12), p. 38-42.
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the enemy. It is debatable, and beyond the scope of this paper, whether military
training itself does violence to soldiers’ character, but the report leaves little doubt
that soldiers’ moral fiber is endangered by extended deployments.
Unfortunately, little hard data exists on the effects of tele-war on pilots’ character.
The only literature with even marginal relevance are studies of video-gamers, and
the studies themselves are often produced by Evangelical groups with a preexisting
bias against that particular medium. However, while solid data is sparse, anecdotal
evidence abounds about the dehumanization of other players in online environments
like X-Box Live20. The fear that warfare could look more like a Halo tournament than
an armed conflict is a terrifying thought, indeed.
The measure, according to the Christian, of any human being is the person of Christ.
Jesus is the fullest, most true human who ever lived, and Christian anthropology
consists of examining Christ and finding ways of imitating Christ. The most salient
feature of Christ for this discussion is the paschal sacrifice — Christ’s self-sacrifice for
the redemption of humanity.
It is clear that all Christians are called toward the imitation of Christ’s sacrifice, but
few are called to quite as literal a sacrifice as the soldier. It is telling, and distressing,
that less than a quarter of soldiers and marines understand that they should be willing
to put their lives on the line in defense of the innocent — be they American or Iraqi.
From this viewpoint, It is quite conceivable that by placing soldiers out of danger,
you enable them to sacrifice themselves more readily, since they are not facing death
itself. If the sacrifice is not the final sacrifice, it is doubtless easier to make. Indeed,
the sort of practice in sacrificing oneself could conceivably make airmen more likely to
be able to make the final sacrifice should it be necessary.
However, the emotional and epistemological distancing that results from teleoper-
20Chipman.
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ated warfare can make the airman less connected to the reality of battle; numb to the
intense suffering the airman is causing. Indeed, this may be called the Quake effect21;
when one’s enemies are merely marks on a screen, it becomes easier to be cruel to
them.
On balance; it seems that tele-operated warfare may actually be morally salutary
— the smaller footprint of a drone, combined with the sacrificial nature of the work, if
necessary, objectively lessens casualties on the prosecutorial side. However, great care,
it appears, must be taken to ensure that Airmen are acutely aware at all times of the
gravity of their actions, and are reminded that they are not playing a videogame.
4.6 Ethical Issues in Autonomous Robots
Ethical issues in Autonomous Robots are considerably more complex. Part of this
complexity derives from the fact that an autonomous robot is still hypothetical at the
moment, although such a robot appears to be coming closer and closer to reality with
each passing month. Most of the current controversy involves system architecture
— how does one construct an ethical robot? How should one build a robot to make
ethical decisions?
Before proceeding, it is important to establish one key point. There has been
some controversy over the ethical status of robots themselves — are they moral
agents? Mere instruments? Some hybrid of both? The questions are fascinating, and
Floridi and Sanders’ seminal paper on the subject22 has been the subject of intense
speculation, research, and criticism. However, as interesting as these questions are,
and as intriguing as this premise is, it remains a minority view. Thus, this paper will
21A neologism coined by me; the name is taken from a classic first-person shooter videogame
22Luciano Floridi and J.W. Sanders, ‘On the Morality of Artificial Agents’, Minds and Machine,
14 (2004):3 〈URL: http://goo.gl/fhwOZ〉.
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assume the current majority view — that robots are to be viewed as instruments in
the classical sense, albeit ones which can function automatically and, in the limited
sense given in section 4.4, are autonomous.
4.6.1 Embedded Values
Not all instruments are created equal. Voices as disparate as the philosopher Deborah
Johnson23, and the famous Protestant moralist Oliver O’Donovan24 agree that different
instruments can have different moral values. Instruments are normally evaluated based
upon what moral agents do with those instruments — an axe could be an implement
to chop firewood, or an implement in a grisly murder, a` la Lizzie Borden. However,
certain instruments, by virtue of their design, take on a moral character. An army
rifle is not the same weapon as a sawed-off shotgun with its serial number filed away
— the former is more likely to be a morally neutral weapon of war, while the second
one has been imbued with certain, terrible values of murder.
The question, then, is what values are we imputing to our technology when we
design it? Are our robotic weapons more like a standard army rifle or more like the
weapon of a criminal? I propose that there are two types of values we can be imputing
to our technology:
Direct — those we are consciously imparting to our technology
Indirect — those we are not consciously imparting to our technology
23Deborah G. Johnson, ‘Computer Systems: Moral Entities but Not Moral Agents’, Ethics and
Information Technology 8 (2006):4.
24Oliver O’Donovan, The Just War Revisited, (Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 78-94.
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Within the constraints of robot ethics, this dichotomy becomes:
Direct — How are we instructing the robot to make ethical decisions?
Indirect — How do the integral systems of the robot prejudice its ethical decisions?
Each of these two sets of embedded values is worthy of its own ethical reflection.
4.6.2 Indirect Values
The indirect values are, paradoxically, somewhat easier to tackle. Kraemer et al25
have argued persuasively that seemingly inconsequential technical decisions can have a
substantial moral impact. In particular, they focus on the technical decisions involved
in an MRI machine’s programming — how an unavoidable decision between favoring
false negatives and false positives has substantial moral impact. It is trivial to suspect
that the same sorts of decisions involved in subroutines of an autonomous robot —
everything from identifying targets with the vision system, to aiming the weapon,
to deciding whether to fire at all, can be prejudiced by a programmer’s decision.
While such decisions obviously need to be balanced by technical realities, it is worth
examining the moral impact of such prejudice.
The two major premises we have identified earlier as our major guiding principles
are justice and mercy; there is a natural tension between them. Justice is the principle
which stands against sinfulness, and opposes structures which work against the common
good. Mercy, however, is the principle which governs the responsible use of power,
and encourages restraint against the abuses inherent in power. In a paradoxical way,
the tension between justice and mercy is itself a mirror of the difficult decision of
prejudice. Since the two principles are in tension, one must ultimately prejudice one
25Felicitas Kraemer, Kees van Overveld and Martin Peterson, ‘Is there an ethics of algo-
rithms?’ Ethics and Information Technology, (2010) 〈URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/
s10676-010-9233-7〉, ISSN 1388–1957.
66
Chapter 4: Mercy and Justice in Robot Ethics
over the other. The ethical question becomes, then, which principle do we prejudice?
I argue that we should prejudice mercy over justice.
The reason we should prejudice mercy over justice is that justice presupposes
knowledge — the criminal justice system has an elaborate process for determining
truth (a trial), which when applied to law results (hopefully) in justice. However, in
programming an autonomous robot for a battlefield environment, we know a priori
that it impossible to program a robot for all possible contingencies. Thus, in the
interest of epistemological humility, we must concede that there will be situations
which robots will encounter which are entirely unanticipated by the programmers.
While one would hope that the robot would still function as desired in such a situation,
it is inevitable that the robot will err. Since we know it will err, we should have it err
on the side of the principle which does not presuppose the knowledge which we lack —
mercy.
By electing to prejudice mercy in the design of a robot, we are electing to say that,
where a robot is in doubt, it should err on the side against the use of deadly force.
Without such a caveat, we could potentially violate the core reason which justified
the use of robots in the first place: the greater ability of a robot to be a discriminate
weapon of war.
4.6.3 Direct Values
The major controversy regarding the programming of an artificial conscience come
from two separate reports detailing two different approaches to the same problem. Lin,
et al. ,26 in a report for the Office of Naval Research, advocate a virtue-ethics based
approach to the problem, which focuses on machine learning techniques. In essence,
26Patrick Lin, George Bekey and Keith Abney, Autonomous Military Robotics: Risk, Ethics, and
Design, (Office of Naval Research, 2008) – Technical report.
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Lin, et al. see the aforementioned problem of robotic ethics as almost insurmountable.
They argue that it is both unreasonable and impossible for programmers to anticipate
every situation that a robot may encounter. Rather than attempting to fight the
problem, however, Lin et al. embrace a machine-learning approach, wherein they
attempt to allow the robot to develop its own internal ethical rules in response to
training.
In a separate report for the Army Research Office27, which was later developed into a
monograph28, Ronald Arkin argues for a more classical model of robotic governance. He
details an ethical governor subroutine which is based on a fundamentally deontological
ethical model, based upon the laws of war and the rules of engagement for a particular
conflict. Unlike Lin et al., who produced a white paper arguing for a broad direction of
future research, Arkin backs his report with a painstaking technical description of how
such a governor could be built. While a technical critique of Arkin’s implementation
of his principle is beyond the scope of this paper, the salient question is which of the
two approaches to favor.
In short, I favor Arkin’s approach over Lin et al.’s, but in order to justify my
opposition, we will need a brief diversion on the nature of machine learning. The
following is a very compressed, and therefore obviously distorted, description of
machine learning. Readers interested in a much more comprehensive description are
encouraged to consult Alpaydin’s excellent and very accessible monograph on the
subject29.
27Ronald C. Arkin, Governing Lethal Behavior: Embedding Ethics in a Hybrid Deliberative/Reactive
Robot Architecture, (U.S. Army Research Office, 2007) – Technical report.
28Idem, Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous Robots (as in n. 14).
29E. Alpaydin, Introduction to Machine Learning, (MIT Press, 2010), Adaptive Computa-
tion and Machine Learning 〈URL: http://books.google.com/books?id=_i2WPwAACAAJ〉, ISBN
9780262012430.
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Brief Intro to Machine Learning
There are many problems in computer science that are difficult to solve. What makes
them difficult to solve, however, can vary considerably.
Some problems are difficult to solve because they are difficult to describe mathe-
matically; when one claims that one wants to build a computer program which can
“read” a newspaper, what does that really mean? Is it an attempt to take a scanned
image and return out ASCII text? Is it an attempt to process the text and be able
to perform statistical analysis on interesting words in the text? Or is it an attempt
to tag words within a given text sample with meaningful metadata? The ambiguity
in the description of the problem limits the potential of a good solution; the more
precisely a problem can be described, the better the solution.
Some problems are difficult to solve because they no good algorithm exists to
solve it. Consider the famous traveling salesman problem: given a list of cities (say,
the capitals of Europe), and a list of distances between any two of them, what is
the shortest route that visits all of the capitals of Europe once, without repeating a
capital? This is an extensively studied problem, and is part of a class of problems
called NP-Complete30 problems. The only known algorithms which will guarantee the
shortest possible route require a number of calculations which grows exponentially
with the number of cities. With a sufficiently large list of cities, even the fastest
computer on earth could not return a solution within the expected lifetime of the
universe.
Some problems, however, are hard in a different way. Unlike the previous set
where algorithms do exist, albeit lousy ones, to solve a given problem, there are some
cases where no algorithm exists to adequately solve a given problem. For example,
30This classification is one of several in the larger field of complexity theory.
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Figure 4.3: What is the shortest route which travels to all of the capitals once, and
does not repeat a capital? Map of Europe with Capitals, courtesy mapsof.net
translating passages from one language to another is a very difficult process. A direct
dictionary-to-dictionary translation is a bad solution (as anyone who has used Google
Translate knows), but difficulties in translation often come from different languages’
requirements for semantic information. English, for example, requires the gender of
a linguistic subject to be identified (he did vs. she did), but Hebrew, on the other
hand, has no such requirement. The reason that such translation is possible is that
the correct translation must be inferred from context, but it is very difficult (and
sometimes impossible) to encode subroutines for context.
Machine learning is an attempt to make a context-sensitive machine, by allowing
the program itself to “learn” by observing a set of training data. The idea behind
machine learning is that, rather than provide an explicit algorithm for solving a
problem, the machine can develop its own algorithm to solve a given problem. For
an adequate example of how machine learning techniques work, let us examine the
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problem of classifying nouns in an piece of English prose31. Some are easily resolved
by resorting to a dictionary (Omaha, for example, can generally only refer to a place),
but others are not quite as simple. The word apple can refer to a number of different
things — to the computer company, to the literal fruit, the surname of a popular
singer-songwriter (Ms. Fiona Apple), or as part of a poetic sobriquet for New York
City (the big apple). In order to allow a computer to differentiate which of the types
of nouns a given one is, we have to make it sensitive to context. In order to do that,
we follow a four-step algorithm.
First, one makes an attempt at listing as many different linguistic observations as
possible. This is crucial, since the strength of the algorithm can depend on how many
independent observations we have. Linguistic observations can be things like:
• Is the noun capitalized?
• Is the noun followed by a prefix? (e.g. Mr. or Dr.)
• Does the noun begin a sentence?, etc.
After making as many separate observations as possible, one then decides on a
technique to allow the computer to assign weights to each of the different observations
(different models can be used in different contexts; examples include a hidden Markov
model (HMM), support vector machine (SVM), or an artificial neural network (ANN).
Each of these models assigns weight to the series of linguistic observations in a
probabilistic sense — if the model is fed training data where every proper noun is
capitalized, then capitalization will have significant weight in determining whether or
not a given noun is proper.
After selecting a model, one subsequently exposes the model to training data — in
this case, a set of English prose pieces where the nouns have been properly categorized.
31part of a field called Natural Language Processing (NLP)
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This allows the model to calibrate the probabilistic weights of each of the separate
linguistic observations. After sufficient exposure to training data, the model is then
ready to tackle volumes of prose.
There are significant benefits to this approach. It allows a machine which can
achieve good results, and can categorize massive amounts of material; far more than
any human could read. However, there are some drawbacks. First of all, this approach
is probabilistic — it is a best guess, based on past experience. This means that, while
machine learning algorithms can succeed very often with very high chances of success,
these models can, and do, fail. Furthermore, because the models are probabilistic,
these models fail unpredictably, and when they fail, they tend to fail badly. A highly
visible example is the success of IBM’s Watson32 system, which, while winning handily
against two previous Jeopardy! champions, failed rather spectacularly on the final
question; the system answered Toronto to a question whose category was US Cities.
Furthermore, these models are uninterrogable; the model itself consists purely of a
series of probabilistic weights. It is therefore exceedingly difficult to audit and modify.
4.7 Critique of Machine-Learning in Autonomous
Robots
Having now established what Machine Learning techniques are, and some salient
characteristics of them, we can now begin to get at the heart of why Arkin’s approach
is superior to Lin et al.’s.
As established earlier, I am arguing against the view of robots as anything more
than automatic instruments, especially against those who view robots as having a
32Markoff.
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kind of quasi-agency. On the one hand, this simplifies some objections to the use of
robots that have been raised, both from a legal33 and a moral34 perspective. In order
to ensure that an automatic instrument of war is moral, I argue that there are three
salient characteristics necessary to fulfill the discriminate criteria of Just War theory:
Performance — A robot should perform well (i.e. fire when it should fire, and not
fire when it should not fire).
Predictability — When the robot fails to perform correctly, a robot should behave
predictably (it should be able to be known when the robot tends to fail).
Legibility — When a robot does perform an unethical act, it should be capable of
being audited to determine why the robot behaved unethically35.
Machine Learning techniques fail on the last two of these three criteria. Lin et al.
argue that machine learning techniques could allow a robot to perform better than any
other alternative. In sheer terms of performance, they argue, I think persuasively, that
performance would be improved by a machine-learning approach, and by guarding
carefully the robot from encountering anything drastically unlike the training data36.
However, I remain skeptical that such a set of safeguards could ever practically occur
on the battlefield.
Furthermore, I do not think that the approach argued for by Lin et al. would guard
against the unpredictable failures inherent in a probabilistic model. The consensus view
is, I think appropriately, that the military should not hold robotics to a perfect ethical
standard, but should expect robotic weapons to perform more ethically, on average,
than other weapon systems (e.g. a squad of soldiers). However, the unpredictability
33Asaro.
34Sharkey, ‘Intelligent Systems 23 [2008]’ (as in n. 8).
35I am here indebted to Cory Doctorow, ‘Human-Readable’, in: With a Litle Help, ( Self-
Published, 2011) 〈URL: http://craphound.com/walh/Cory_Doctorow_-_With_a_Little_Help.
html#769〉, who is in turn indebted to Natalie Jerimijenko, Feral Robotic Dogs, 2005 〈URL:
http://www.nyu.edu/projects/xdesign/feralrobots/〉
36Lin, Bekey and Abney (as in n. 26), p. 40.
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of a robotic system programmed whose ethics routine was developed using machine-
learning techniques undercuts this standard. Not all failures of a system are created
equal. As we have already see earlier, it is preferable that a system not fire on an enemy
than to fire upon an innocent. Furthermore, some critical failures are considerably
worse than others — Sharkey’s nightmare scenario is a robot who mistakes a young
girl’s ice-cream cone for a rifle37; the is clearly a much more serious error. Lin et al.
are not unmindful of this error, and recommend certain workarounds, including only
deploying robots in “engagement zones,” or, more prosaically, “kill boxes”38 — areas
where all non-combatants are assumed to be evacuated. I am not certain that this is
an acceptable compromise, but appears prudent. Indeed, despite my hesitancy, I am
also unenthused by some of Arkin’s scenarios39 where he expects a robot to be able
to differentiate between non-combatants and combatants in the sort of door-to-door
warfare which has characterized war in Iraq.
Indeed, this difficulty seems to be the single biggest obstacle to the widespread use
of robots in warfare. While it is conceivable that a robot could differentiate between
rival armies in a formal battlefield scenario, it is much less likely to work properly
in an environment which looks much less like what is traditionally conceived of as
a military conflict. Indeed, given their cost, it is unlikely that any but the most
well-funded armies will progress towards robotization, despite the breathless hopes
of some. While everyone would prefer that the next major conflict would look more
like an episode of the television show Battlebots than the grisly footage from Iraq and
Afghanistan, it is unlikely, simply because globalization has, for the moment at least,
made overt war between the great world powers unlikely. Most of the conflicts of the
37Noel Sharkey, ‘Automated Killers and the Computing Profession’, Computer , 40 (2007) 〈URL:
http://goo.gl/xPzwz〉.
38Lin, Bekey and Abney (as in n. 26), p. 77.
39Arkin, Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous Robots (as in n. 14), p. 155-176.
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past 10 years have not been conflicts between modern states, but between states and
non-state actors like Al-Qaeda, who disregard the traditional laws of war.
4.8 Conclusion
The problems of robotic warfare will inevitably come to the forefront in the coming
decades. Semi-autonomous robots pose threats to soldiers’ characters, and there will
be a great debate as to whether the risks of a airman emotionally distant from the
wars she prosecutes is superior to the documented risks that extended deployments
pose to soldiers’ mental, emotional, spiritual, and moral health. The lack of hard data
on the subject makes ethical conclusions speculative at best; I urge rigorous study of
these related questions.
The ethical issues relating to autonomous robots are also disconcerting. Ethi-
cally, I have argued we should favor mercy over justice when programming for the
unforeseeable, and therefore err on the side against lethal force. Furthermore, I argue
against using a machine-learning driven virtue-ethics based approach to designing
autonomous robots, because they are inscrutable — machine learning techniques
can deliver extremely accurate results, but they are not human readable, nor are
their failures predicable. In light of the inequality of potential errors, as well as our
preexisting decision to prejudice mercy over justice, I hope that we would favor a
system which, while perhaps somewhat more error prone, makes more merciful errors
than the alternative.
The at least partial robotization of the United States military, and the militaries of
the other great western powers seems all but unavoidable in the coming decades. Just
as the age of the archer, the knight, the cannon, the bomber, and the nuclear warhead
have each had their effect on traditional just war thinking, we will soon see reflection
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on the entrance of robots in the battlefield. Within this reflection, there will doubtless
be many voices contributing to the discussion; I can only pray that Christians will be
among them, reminding military leaders of the demands of mercy and justice.
Furthermore, I hope that military and political leaders contemplating robotization
understand the implications of such an endeavor — both on the character of the
military itself, and also in the conduct of its autonomous tools. Indeed, I sincerely hope
that those tasked both with beginning and prosecuting robotized warfare contemplate
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Spirituality can be defined as micro-level religious experience — the experience of
an individual. In a sense, everyone has his or her own unique spirituality, insofar as
everyone has his or her own individual experience of God. Defined this way, such a
concept might not seem to be terribly helpful. However, spiritualities are also common
to societies and sub-societies. Although everyone’s experience is unique, there are
broad currents and patterns that can be characterized across groups of people, as
they bring similar concerns, tools, and language to their understanding of God. Thus,
one can speak of an african-american spirituality, a spirituality of the poor, a queer
spirituality, or a feminine spirituality. There are also spiritualities of health-care
workers, for example, or spiritualities of legal professionals. Necessarily as the classes
grow larger, the common currents become fewer, and the more general statements
must become. Spiritualities also can follow the lead of major spiritual subfigures
within a religion. Thus, within the Catholic, Christian tradition, there are still many
sub-spiritualities: Ignatian (after St. Ignatius Loyola), Fransciscan (after St. Francis
of Assisi), Dominican (after St. Dominic), or Theresan (after St. Therese of Lisieux).
One prominent group of people has not had the same level of attention paid to
their spirituality, however: computer professionals. Mostly associated with a kind of
hyper-rational atheism, many church leaders, either fearful of computers, those who
work with them, or both, have tended to ignore modern computer culture, and its
attendant spirituality. In this paper, I hope to describe the implicit spirituality in
modern Hacker culture, and show its parallels with Ignatian spirituality.
5.1 Introduction
As computers have risen, they have correspondingly given rise to their own distinct
culture, apart from their effect on human culture. Rather than merely ordinary people
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who have accepted that they now type in word-processors instead of on typewriters,
or artists who use Adobe Photoshop instead of countless pages of sketchbooks, some
people have taken computers a step further, to truly embrace computers’ potential to
change their lives, and to make them an integral, rather than tangential part of their
lives. This group of people can be identified as a distinct subgroup as far back as the
early 1950’s, nurtured at institutions like MIT, where a true embrace of computing
— an entire lifestyle, really — could be seized on by undergraduates. Together, they
created a culture, known affectionately as hacking. Originally an MIT neologism for
the elaborate pranks undergraduates would use at the university, it came to refer to a
group of people who found deep joy in the same level of skill It has been carried on at
other institutions, like Stanford and the University of California, at Berkeley.1 Now
it lives on in the virtual world of the internet, complete with its own argot2, its own
explicit definitions of excellence3, and its own rites of initiation.4. It has even received
some limited scholarly attention.5.
Thus, the Hacker phenomenon, by anyone’s recognition, qualifies as a subculture,
and, as a subculture, it has its own attendant spirituality. However, the theological
establishment has been reluctant to engage with computers in general, much less with
hackers in particular. While the Vatican has done more than any other organized
religious group to at least acknowledge the role of computers in society, by releasing
two documents on the matter6, they are far from a comprehensive cyber-theology.
They are much less attending to its spirituality — they make no acknowledgement of
1See Steven Levy, Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution, 1st edition. (Anchor
Press/Doubleday, 1984)
2Raymond, ‘The Jargon File’.
3Idem, ‘The Art of Unix Programming’.
4Idem, ‘How To Become A Hacker’.
5A.E. Adam, ‘Hacking into hacking: Gender and the hacker phenomenon’, Proceedings of Computer
Ethics Philsophical Enquiry [2003].
6Pontifical Council for Social Communications, ‘Church in Internet’; idem, ‘Ethics in Internet’.
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it. Thus, I plan to address it at least briefly in this paper. In section 5.2, I hope to
discuss the driving force behind the Hacker phenomenon, and show its parallels to
the Ignatian ideal of finding God in all things. From there, in section 5.3, I examine
the consequent missionary impulse of modern Hacker culture, and compare it to the
historical Jesuit commitment to mission and zeal for souls. In section 5.4, I compare
the Hacker zeal for excellence to the Jesuit idea of magis — striving for more, and
show how closely they parallel. I examine competing ideas on service and relational
anthropology in section 5.5. In section 5.6, I examine hacker ideas of formation, and
contrast them with Jesuit ideals of formation. Finally, I close in section 5.7.
5.2 Joy
5.2.1 Art, Science, and Play: Hacker’s Joy
One key insight into the Hacker mindset is that these are people who have consciously
made the decision to embrace computers and programming into their lifestyle. Thus,
they derive not merely utilitarian satisfaction from doing so — Business executives
are perhaps the ur-example of that framework — they derive satisfaction from doing
so. This is most clearly seen in the writings of E. S. Raymond, a self-proclaimed
“hacker” and major developer of Linux – something of an elder statesman in this
subculture. “Hackers” have a number of characteristics, most clearly addressed in
Raymond’s manifesto, “How To Become A Hacker”7
Raymond describes an ethic of constant innovation, with admonitions like “The
world is full of fascinating problems waiting to be solved.” and “Boredom and drudgery
are evil.”8 Hacker people, then, are those who are constantly internally driven to
7Raymond, ‘How To Become A Hacker’.
8Ibid.
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innovate, because they derive value from the act of innovating itself, not from that
which results from it. Those who do attempt to use hacker techniques for personal
gain – the cyber criminals who give the modern meaning of “hacker” its name – are
disparagingly referred to by Raymond as “crackers” and dismissed.
The other great source for a qualitative description of the joy which derives from
hacking comes from Steven Levy’s work Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution,
which has acquired the status of a major work of folklore in the subculture. While the
book is inundated with descriptions of hackers, a couple of key passages leap out:
“Art, science and play had merged into the magical activity of program-
ming”9
Necessarily, these three ideas — Art, science, and play — come together in this
medium. Nowhere else could one find such an environment, which, built on solid
scientific principles, one is able to create functional objects. Computer programs are
not things like novels, poems, or other objet d’art. They perform functions; they are
tools. Yet, they are unlike other tools in that they are insubstantial — easily copied
and distributed. This lends itself directly to cooperative play — rather than fighting
amongst one another
The people in Homebrew were a me´lange of professionals too passionate
to leave computing at their jobs, amateurs transfixed by the possibilities
of technology, and techno-cultural guerrillas devoted to overthrowing an
oppressive society in which government, business, and especially IBM had
relegated computers to a despised Priesthood.10
9Levy (as in n. 1), p. 120.
10Ibid., p. 200.
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Here we see how this is a true manifestation of the joy of programming — the
passion within these people melds their work and their play, into the same thing, and
they stare, awed at the possibilities of what machines can do for them. Most telling,
though is the description of an ideal company by Mark Duchaineau – a young, hacker
programmer at Sierra On-Line who, faced with the increasing bureaucratization of his
company, dreams of founding his own, utopian workplace:
Duchaineau’s company would be a hacker paradise, with programmers
having every conceivable tool at their disposal to create awesome software.
If a programmer felt the company needed a piece of equipment, say some
supercalibrated oscilloscope, he would not have to get permission from
unconnected management channels. . . he and his fellow hackers would have
a large say in the process.11
It’s a telling description of paradise — one where the people have all of the tools
that they need to create awesome software. Duchaineau doesn’t dream of “enough
royalties to buy cherry-red Trans-Ams and Caribbean trysts with hot-blooded software
groupies.”12 Rather, his ideal company merely gives him the ability to pursue the joy
of programming unimpeded.
5.2.2 Moments of Consolation: Ignatian Joy
This same sort of deep joy that Ignatius finds in the Spiritual Exercises:
The perfect, through constant contemplation and enlightenment of their
understanding, more readily consider, meditate, and contemplate God
11Levy (as in n. 1), p. 378.
12Ibid., p. 389.
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our Lord as being present in every creature by his essence, presence, and
power13
Ignatius makes a few key qualifications here:
1. He’s referring to the perfect here; so this is clearly to be taken not as a declarative
statement, but instead as an ideal to be striven toward. Indeed, the word “perfect”
as it occurs in Matthew’s Gospel is teleios14 (τ ´λις); what Ignatius seems to be
quoting is not perfection in the English sense of being without flaw or without
limitation, but rather in the sense of being completed, or brought to its final
end. Thus, it might be rephrased as, “the whole person, considers, meditates,
and contemplates God our Lord as being present in every creature . . . ”
2. God’s essence is present in every creature. For Ignatius, this means recognizing
the fundamental divine nature in all interactions by virtue of its creation. This
same attribute could be attributed to hackers, who recognize the beauty of a
computer system in its boundless possibility.
3. God is not merely present essentially (in an Aristotelian, Thomistic sense) with
creation; he is, in fact present within creation — God, himself, for Ignatius, is
present in all things, using them for divine ends. Ignatius takes a strong view of
providence — for Ignatius, everything is a tool for God to bring about a better
end, including people; the great triumph of his spirituality, then, is his suscipe
prayer, where the human not only acknowledges this sense, but embraces it:
13Ignatius of Loyola, The Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius, trans. by George E. Ganss, SJ (Loyola
Press, 1992), p. 36.
14James F. Keenan, SJ, ‘”Whose Perfection is it Anyway?”: A Virtuous Consideration of Enhance-
ment’, Christian Bioethics, 5 (1999):2.
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“Take, Lord, and receive all my liberty, my memory, my understanding,
and all my will — all that I have and possess. You, Lord, have given
all that to me. I new give it back to you, O Lord. All of it is yours.
Dispose of it according to your will. Give me love of yourself, along
with your grace, for that is enough for me.”15
4. God, finally, is present in his power ; this is perhaps the greatest level of overlap.
For Ignatius, God is present through an ongoing process of creation — rather
than being a singular event, at the beginning of time as described in Genesis, it
is a continually ongoing process, and God is not only creator, but also sustainer,
and human beings are co-participants, ultimately, in creation. It is this which
brings the mystic out of the computer hacker16; there is a sense in which the
hacker, through his or her own act of creating software, is also participating in
the divine act of creation.
5.3 Mission
5.3.1 The Contagious, Wondrous Joy of Programming: Hack-
ers’ Mission
The joy and elation that hackers find in the Divine Presence as described in Section
5.2 is contagious. Once established, there is a powerful urge among people in the
hacking community to share their results with one another — to their way of thinking,
there are only problems to be solved, and reduplicating work is an offense akin to a
15Ignatius of Loyola (as in n. 13), p. 95.
16Raymond, ‘The Jargon File’.
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sin. Although they can be curmudgeonly to the utterly clueless,17 there is a general
collegiality which is implicit in the culture. Levy describes it when Lee Felsenstein
began working on the Sol computer, which was intended to be a computer for the
masses — essentially a PC, for community use, a full 10 years before its time. The
computer itself was described thusly:
Sol Computer Lee Felsenstein’s terminal-and-computer, built in two
frantic months, almost the computer that turned things around. Almost
wasn’t enough.18
Felsenstein is man both entranced and horrified at the powers that computers
give to people. His colleague, Efrem Lipkin, an activist from New York who found
himself at Berkeley in 1973, said, “I love computers and hate what computers can
do”19 Computers at the time of Levy’s writing were inextricably bound up with large
institutions — tools reserved for the wealthy and powerful, who could afford to pay
large machines to replace men and women for things like payroll checks. Felsenstein’s
computer, then, is a revolutionary statement: one which considers the missionary
imperative so powerful that he is driven to work to his physical extreme:
Completing the Sol was a process that took six weeks of fourteen- to
seventeen-hour days, seven days a week.20
Again, we see hackers, so driven in their pursuit of excellence, that they are willing
to ignore, when necessary, basic human comforts, because they thrive so dearly on the
joy of the job at hand. This kind of missionary zeal is the same sort of ability to deny
17There is an entire essay on how to properly ask questions, see Eric S. Raymond and Rick
Moen, How To Ask Questions The Smart Way, 2008 〈URL: http://www.catb.org/˜esr/faqs/
smart-questions.html〉
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the physical necessities of existence in favor of their urge to bring the kind of joy they
experience in programming to the people. It can even be seen in their eyes:
He would often entertain the young hardware hackers who designed these
products, and his wife would always recognize them at a glance. “Because
they all had the same thing,” Solomon would later explain. “That little
burning inside the eyeball. She used to say there was an inside personality,
and though they looked like disreputable bums, you looked them in the
face, you looked in those eyes and you knew who they were. She’d look at
them and what would come out was the brightness, the intense-ness [sic].”
5.3.2 Ignatian Indifference: Poverty, and the Mission
This kind of burning, sustaining passion (even something that transcends social
standing), is what characterizes both the Hacker and the Jesuit. Initially, when Ignatius
was beginning to write the Constitutions, he raised some eyebrows by describing the
fourth vow — the full profession which is only characteristic of the eldest Jesuits. The
fourth vow is one of special obedience to the pope in matters of mission, and not
to request anything in order to complete it21. Although many at the time thought
that at least the first part of the vows (special obedience to the Pope) was at least
implicit to any religious order22, the critics of the Jesuits missed the point. Ignatius’s
conception of the Jesuits was, to borrow a military metaphor, an ecclesiastical “special
forces” unit, deployable anywhere, at a moment’s notice.
Such a mindset even figures into their conception of poverty. Ignatius departs
notably from other leaders like Francis in his conception of Poverty. While Francis
21John Hungerford Pollen, ‘The Society of Jesus’, (Robert Appleton Company, 1912) 〈URL:
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/14081a.htm〉.
22John W. O’Malley, The First Jesuits, (Harvard University Press, 1993).
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referred to poverty as “his divine mistress,” Ignatius’s attitude to poverty places it
squarely under his emphasis on mission; Jesuits do not actively disavow money like the
Fransciscans; rather, they instead disavow any personal ownership of their resources,
and place them all in the service of the mission. Levy discusses a similar approach by
some hackers:
“Our initial goal was not necessarily to get infinitely rich,” explained
co-founder Mike Levitt in 1983, “but to control our own destiny. We don’t
owe anybody anything.”23
Levitt is discussing a company broken off from the famed MIT-Artificial Intelligence
Lab, who were making a business to implement LISP, one of the first high-level
programming languages which is still in use — only FORTRAN is older. The idea of a
LISP machine — a machine with a sufficiently abstract programming language that
one could write programs for any given computer, not merely this particular machine,
was a liberating one. Its promise was so great that it even caused strife among the
hackers themselves:
Greenblatt was so focused on making LISP machines, on the mission of
hacking, on the work that had to be done, that he often neglected to
acknowledge people’s humanity.24
Why do these things have to be done? Because this mission, this intense drive, is
characteristic of hacking. Cory Doctorow, a noted blogger and author, also describes
the missionary zeal in his young adult novel, “Little Brother.”
23Levy (as in n. 1).
24Ibid.
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If you’ve never programmed a computer, you should. There’s nothing like
it in the whole world. When you program a computer, it does exactly what
you tell it to do. It’s like designing a machine – any machine, like a car,
like a faucet, like a gas-hinge for a door – using math and instructions.
It’s awesome in the truest sense: it can fill you with awe.25
In this way, Doctorow’s work has a hortatory facet; the novel is aimed at young
people, and here he describes the joy associated with this practice of programming in
order to entice them to practice it themselves. This is another part of the missionary
impulse: to educate a new generation of enthusiastic programmers to create awesome
software. Hacker culture has built up a substantial mythos around the process of
young people becoming hackers, involving first an interest in hacking26, followed
by what is termed larval stage27 — a period of growing, and deepening focus and
attention on hacking, not unlike the Spiritual Exercises of a young Jesuit. The
Exercises, in canonical form, are a period of intense reflection, over a monthlong
period, following a strict plan of meditations under the guidance of a trained director.
Hacker culture’s analogue isn’t nearly as structured as the exercises (Hackers tend to
have an anti-authoritarian streak, after all), but it does follow the same general idea.
5.4 Magis
5.4.1 Raymond’s Ethic of Constant Innovation
Another aspect where Hackers and Jesuits are similar is in their mutual striving toward
excellence. Ignatius himself gave the order its motto: Ad Maiorem Dei Gloriam —
25Doctorow, ‘Little Brother’, p. 49.
26Raymond, ‘How To Become A Hacker’.
27Idem, ‘The Jargon File’.
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“For the Greater Glory of God.” Hackers have a similar, but distinct idea of collegiality
that all involves working toward a common end. Raymond gives a good description in
his guide for beginners, “How to Become a Hacker.” He first begins by assuming his
first premise: “The world is full of fascinating problems waiting to be solved.” Having
established that, he goes on:
2. No problem should ever have to be solved twice.
Creative brains are a valuable, limited resource. They shouldn’t be wasted
on re-inventing the wheel when there are so many fascinating new problems
waiting out there.
To behave like a hacker, you have to believe that the thinking time of other
hackers is precious – so much so that it’s almost a moral duty for you to
share information, solve problems and then give the solutions away just
so other hackers can solve new problems instead of having to perpetually
re-address old ones.28
Raymond’s ethic, then, is one of constant innovation. He’s arguing that there is a
moral dimension to innovation — that hackers not only are compelled to do so by
the joy they find as discussed in Section 5.2, but that there is a moral imperative to
innovate. He covers it more explicitly further on:
3. Boredom and drudgery are evil.
Hackers (and creative people in general) should never be bored or have
to drudge at stupid repetitive work, because when this happens it means
they aren’t doing what only they can do – solve new problems. This
28Raymond, ‘How To Become A Hacker’.
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wastefulness hurts everybody. Therefore boredom and drudgery are not
just unpleasant but actually evil.
To behave like a hacker, you have to believe this enough to want to
automate away the boring bits as much as possible, not just for yourself
but for everybody else (especially other hackers).
(There is one apparent exception to this. Hackers will sometimes do things
that may seem repetitive or boring to an observer as a mind-clearing
exercise, or in order to acquire a skill or have some particular kind of
experience you can’t have otherwise. But this is by choice – nobody who
can think should ever be forced into a situation that bores them.)
This is a pretty startling claim. While almost everyone would agree that boredom
and drudgery are deeply unpleasant things, to be avoided if at all possible, very few
people would equate them as evils. That is, however, exactly what Raymond is doing
— he’s essentially being a moral utilitarian, except good is tied directly to technical
innovation. Real evils, for Raymond, come from those things which impede innovation
— it is morally wrong to impede (more than necessary), bright, technical people who
are trying to solve problems.
5.4.2 Ignatian Ethic of Striving for Perfection
This doesn’t sound like a particularly Christian, let alone Ignatian, worldview. In one
sense it’s not, but when compared to Ignatius himself, there are striking similarities:
Principle and Foundation
The other things on the face of the earth are created for the human beings,
to help them in the pursuit of the end for which they are created.
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From this it follows that we ought to use these things to the extent that
they help us toward our end, and free ourselves from them to the extent
that they hinder us from it.
To attain this it is necessary to make ourselves indifferent to all created
things, in regard to everything which is left to our free will and is not
forbidden. Consequently on our own part we ought not to seek health rather
than sickness, wealth rather than poverty, honor rather than dishonor, a
long life rather than a short one, and so on in all other matters.
Rather, we ought to desire and choose only that which is more conducive
to the end for which we are created.29
Ignatius, interestingly, takes almost the same line of reasoning that Raymond does.
He places one goal — salvation — above all others, and argues that its pursuit is
the sole imperative — do what brings you salvation (that which God commands), all
else is irrelevant. However, it is not enough for Ignatius to adopt a position that one
should merely seek salvation — Ignatius, though moderate in most respects, brooks
no compromise with moderation here — this is dogged, full-throated, unequivocal
support for pursuing the salvific, despite everything.
Ignatius isn’t content with that, though — far from it. Rather, he engages in a
full-on pursuit of perfection. Ignatius, like any good chivalric candidate, is not content
with merely pursuing the good — he’s aiming squarely at the best.
The hackers emulate this, as well. One prominent example can be found in the
annals of the Homebrew Computer Club, one of the first Amateur Computer clubs to
arise in the greater San Francsico Bay Area (known now as Silicon Valley):
29Ignatius of Loyola (as in n. 13), p. 32.
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“. . . I remember I had trouble with a teletype machine at my office and
one guy [at Homebrew] said he’d check it out. Not only did he check it
out but he came out with a little kit and he put in four or five different
parts, oiled it, lubed it, adjusted all the gears. I said, ‘How much do I
owe you?’ He said, ‘Nothing.’ ” To the Junk Man, that was the essence of
Homebrew.30
This pursuit of excellence is the essence of Homebrew — hacking, in general, really.
The group goal — excellence, is put above all others, including personal gain. The
hacker named is not under any external coercion to aid his fellow; he does it voluntarily.
This mirrors Ignatius’s conception of resources within his new, Jesuit order: selfless
exercise of resources in pursuit of common salvation.
5.5 Service
As we have already seen, Hackers and Jesuits share a common zeal — the Jesuits for
souls, the hackers for solutions. But what is at the heart of both of these cultures’
dedication and fervor? The answer lies in how both groups see the interrelationships
between people, and how these interrelationships form the basis of their respective
societies.
5.5.1 Men and women for others: Jesuit faith that does jus-
tice
One hallmark of Jesuit faith, especially since the superior-generalship of Pedro Arrupe,
came the notion of a faith that does justice:
30Levy (as in n. 1), p. 214.
92
Chapter 5: God in All Code
Today, our prime education objective must be to form men-and-women-
for-others . . . people who cannot even conceive of love of God which does
not include love for the least of their neighbors; people convinced that love
of God which does not issue in justice for human beings is a farce.31
Indeed, the “frontier ministry” which characterizes the Jesuits has always meant
that care for others has always been at the center of Jesuit spiritual life. Ignatius’s
own mission was simple, yet infinitely malleable: “Help souls.”32
The ideal Jesuit, then, does not simply find God in the activities he participates
in, but rather in the people he loves. The ideal Jesuit takes to heart the notion that
“. . . just as you did it to one of the least of these who are members of my family, you
did it to me.33”
5.5.2 Shared labor: Hacker cooperation
The notion of others in hacker culture is quite different. Since members of the culture
seldom meet apart from online contexts, contact is radically different. Raymond freely
admits that hacker culture is a gift culture34, wherein social merit is given to those
who can contribute the greatest to common endeavor. While it is tempting to see this
exchange as explaining the peculiar altruism of the community, it does not.
The reason that the hacker community is a gift culture lies in the fundamental
value of problem-solving associated with the community. As Raymond puts it, “No
problem should ever have to be solved twice,” arguing that one’s compatriots’ time
is so precious that “it’s almost a moral duty for [one] to share information, solve
31George W. Traub, SJ, ‘Do You Speak Ignatian: A Glosary of Terms Used in Ignatian and Jesuit
Circles’, in: Idem, editor, An Ignatian Spirituality Reader, (2008), p. 260-261.
32O’Malley (as in n. 22), p. 22.
33Matthew 25:40
34Raymond, ‘How To Become A Hacker’.
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problems and then give the solutions away just so other hackers can solve new35
problems instead of having to perpetually re-address old ones.”
Ultimately, this altruism derives from a love of community — boredom and drudgery
are considered so evil that self-interest is completely unacceptable. This notion of
service, while not quite rooted in the Christian love of God in neighbor like that of
the Jesuits, is still profoundly allocentric. The devaluation of the self, and the high
regard for the other that characterizes hacker culture is extraordinary, and can find
parallels in Jesuit love.
5.6 Formation
5.6.1 Jesuit Formation
Another major similarity between Hacker culture and Ignatian spirituality, especially
in the modern incarnation of the Jesuits, is a conscious, intentional focus at forming
young people. Both the Hacker community and Ignatius’s disciples begins with a
particular vision of the perfect36 human person, and outline a path toward forming a
person into that ideal.
The Jesuits have many avenues toward formation, but the major two are the
formation of Jesuits themselves and their students. Much of Ignatius’s work in the
Constitutions is dedicated toward the proper formation of his novices. Indeed, Jesuit
training is the longest in the Catholic world. It has five stages37, typically lasting a
dozen years:
35emphasis in the original
36by perfect, I mean in the sense of complete rather than in the sense of without flaw.
37Jesuits of the New England Province.
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1. Novitiate — a two year “introduction” to the society; a man makes the first
three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience at the conclusion
2. First Studies — a three year period of study of philosophy and theology, reflecting
the academic beginnings and apostolic ministry of the society, which is the
beginning of the Jesuit’s ordination studies.
3. Regency — a three year liminal period between First Studies and Theology
Studies, where the Jesuit is encouraged to take full part in the apostolic work of
the society in order to remain grounded in its work
4. Theology Studies — three year period of full-time study in Theology in prepara-
tion for ordination to the priesthood
5. Tertianship — a three-to-five year period of full-time ministry which concludes
the formative process, ending with the Final Vows
Along the way, Jesuits undergo a number of formative experiences on their own,
including a long retreat of 30 days, conducted largely in silence, and a pilgrimage,
conducted without any external resource at all. While each of these steps are themselves
important, the broader picture is the point of reference — the ideal of the whole
person; a man38 utterly in love with Christ — who, seeing the hand and the love of
God at work in every movement in his heart, pursues the goal of sharing this love
with an intensity bordering on ferocity, befitting Ignatius’s admonition to Xavier to,
“go and set the world aflame.”
Jesuit Universities also have very specific idea of what the whole person39 consists
of, and how to form people according to that ideal:
38As a Catholic order of priests, Jesuits are exclusively male
39Traub, SJ (as in n. 31).
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“Formation” can be a problematic term if it suggests indoctrination,
imposing values from the outside, stamping each student from a common
mold that blurs unique gifts and aspirations. It can be a useful term,
however, if it means that a college proposes certain intellectual, social,
moral, and spiritual standards to its students as worth acquiring and living
by, equips them with the knowledge and skills to understand and critically
interpret the world in light of these values, and yet respects their freedom
to discern how these standards can be embodied in the decisions they
make about their own lives.40
Ignatius himself had a very academic ideal of God, who he saw as teaching him as
a schoolmaster taught a particularly obstinate pupil41. In much the same way, as the
academic ministry and the “intellectual apostolate” became a major charism of the
society, the society in turn developed the Ratio Studiorum42 — a plan to educate the
students according to the dictates of cura personalis43, a latin phrase meaning “care
of the whole person.” In essence, this pedagogy was to attempt to bring the whole
character of a student — intellectual, moral, social, and spiritual — under the care
and conscious direction of the institution.
5.6.2 Hacker Formation
This same sort of notion of formation also shows up in Hacker Culture. Probably
the singular text on entrance (though it claims not to be) is Eric Raymond’s How
40Boston College Center for Student Formation, The Journey into Adulthood: Understanding
Student Formation, (Self-Published, 2010).
41John C. Olin, ‘The Idea of Pilgrimage in the Experience of Ignatius Loyola’, Church His-
tory: Studies in Christianity and Culture, 48 (1979):04 〈URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/
S0009640700040269〉, p. 390.
42Traub, SJ (as in n. 31), p. 264.
43Ibid., p. 251.
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to Become a Hacker44, and the corresponding document on Hacker anthropology, A
Portrait of J. Random Hacker45. Like the Jesuit ideal of formation, both begin with
an ideal of a human being, and both proceed toward it. Furthermore, as we have seen,
the anthropology of what precisely constitutes a hacker overlaps considerably with
the Jesuit ideal of the whole person.
In particular, the notion, as we have already seen, of a Hacker being driven
by a notion of mission and service overlaps nicely with the Ignatian model. What
distinguishes Hacker formation from Jesuit formation is how much looser Hacker
formation is. While this is not terribly surprising, given the general anarchist and
adhocratic tendencies of the community, Raymond instead lays out five attitudes, four
skills, and five markers of status. While Raymond offers an essential course of how to
form oneself, it’s much looser than the general plan of the Ignatian plan. Indeed, the
very notion of self-formation is a departure from the Ignatian tradition, wherein the
institution (the order, the university, etc. is responsible for that formation).
However, the same notion of cura personalis is, in fact, at play. Raymond’s portrait
isn’t purely of a dynamic programmer, or even of a general purpose geek. Rather,
he lays out, in his Portrait, a view of a sort of person which is both descriptive and
normative. And, despite the curmudgeonly descriptions given, Raymond does describe
an ultimate community consensus which lays out his idea of formation. The hacker
community, while not taking the same active role in formation as the Jesuits, still lays
out expectations as to how their members should be, and invites others to join them.
44Raymond, ‘How To Become A Hacker’.
45Idem, ‘The Jargon File’, Appendix B..
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5.7 Conclusion
The hacker culture that has arisen in response to the computer revolution is a significant
force in the Information Age. From fundamentally maintaining UNIX, the operating
system of the internet, to reinventing the way we see software though first the free
software movement, and later the open-source movement, including the darling among
web browsers, Mozilla Firefox.
However, hacker culture hasn’t been given the scholarly respect it deserves from
many quarters. It has had a complex relationship with computer scientists, who
generally admire the displays of prodigious skill and communal impulse exhibited
by hackers, while disdaining the culture’s lack of interest in scholarly pursuits and
academic rigor. The rest of academia, however, has either not even noticed them for
the potent cultural force that they are, or has dismissed them as a group of disaffected
nerds — isolated from society, isolated in a technocratic echo-chamber, where they
hold forth childishly on matters of mere technical importance, ignorant to the broader
culture that they scorn.
Such a characterization could not be more wrong, or more dangerous. Whether
or not it goes acknowledged, the writings of people like Richard Stallman and Eric
Raymond have had, and continue to have, a major effect both on those who iden-
tify with their subculture, and those who interact with it — not merely enthusiast
programmers, but also the substantial majority of the world’s computer engineering
professionals.
The impact of the computer on daily life has been underestimated and dismissed
by the theological establishment in general, to its detriment. While the distinct
antipathy of many of the major leaders in the movement to “conventional, faith-
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holding Christianity46” hasn’t helped matters, in no way should this be seen as tacit
permission to ignore them. Real moral and ethical challenges have arisen with the
dawn of the information age, including concerns about privacy, intellectual property,
and free speech, among others. To leave these questions in the secular realm is to do
a disservice to both Theology and Philosophy — simply put, people of Faith have
things to say, as well, even if they’re only able to speak to their co-religionists.
My work in this paper comparing Jesuit and hacker spirituality is not to equate
them. I have no illusions that such such a project could be done, for to impose a thin
veil of Christianity over the existing hacker culture, which is already drawing on other,
separate sources (some of them spiritual, notably Zen Buddhist) is disingenuous and
intellectually dishonest. Rather, I have attempted to describe some of the striking
similarities between the hacker and the Jesuit mindset in order to provide a ground
for dialogue. Without the two traditions at least engaging each other in mutually
comprehensible language, dialogue is doomed to failure. However, failure will surely
see us off with a worse society — which, whether one is motivated to God’s greater
glory, or in the name of solving interesting problems, is, ultimately, a failure.
Such a dialogue is ultimately necessary, however, because hacker culture has a
significant impact upon the culture of computer science as a whole. While hackers
remain a minority subculture, some of the major products of that subculture — notably
the GCC compiler, the GNOME desktop environment, and to a certain degree the
Firefox web browser have taken on major acceptance within the broader technology
community. With that broad acceptance has come a great deal of cultural capital —
the values associated with the open-source and hacker community have become very
important.
46Raymond, ‘The Jargon File’.
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There are three major results that could emerge from such a dialogue. The first
is evangelization — a term I use hesitantly. I do not mean empty or unenlightened
proselytism; such an effort, I think, would be (rightly) rejected. Rather, I mean
evangelism in the fullest of the sense of its greek root  ’υαγγ´λιoν — to share good
news. Indeed, part of any authentic dialogue with the Christian community includes a
witness to the joy which the Christian community finds in its communion with Christ.
The second, of course, is the converse of evangelization — what Christianity
can learn from hacker culture. While there are many significant points of departure,
Christianity can stand to learn a great deal from the passionate embrace and analytical
altruism which characterizes modern hacker culture. Indeed, Levy47 makes a plausible
case that most of hacker culture that we know grew out of the academic culture of the
MIT artificial intelligence lab. Just as Christianity has grown and developed through
its embrace of academic culture, it can also grow as it embraces hacker culture.
The final, and perhaps most important reason for the embrace of Hacker culture is
pedagogical. The sheer impact upon the discipline of computer science and the culture
of its professionals demands that Christian, and especially Catholic schools grant to
their students an awareness of where two major cultural crossroads can synchronize
and where there is tension. The cultural power of both of these traditions is intense,
and to ignore them is to risk allowing students to be caught unaware in a cultural
whirlpool. At the very least, opening students’ eyes to the similarities and differences
between these two major cultures follows the dictates of cura personalis.
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